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ABSTRACT
Recent years have seen an explosion of scholarship on “personal-
ized law.” Commentators foresee a world in which regulators armed
with big data and machine learning techniques determine the
optimal legal rule for every regulated party, then instantaneously
disseminate their decisions via smartphones and other “smart”
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devices. They envision a legal utopia in which every fact pattern is
assigned society’s preferred legal treatment in real time.
But regulation is a dynamic process; regulated parties react to law.
They change their behavior to pursue their preferred outcomes—
which often diverge from society’s—and they will continue to do so
under personalized law: They will provide regulators with incom-
plete or inaccurate information. They will attempt to manipulate the
algorithms underlying personalized laws by taking actions intended
to disguise their true characteristics. Personalized law can also
(unintentionally) encourage regulated parties to act in socially
undesirable ways, a phenomenon known as moral hazard.
Moreover, regulators seeking to combat these dynamics will face
significant constraints. Regulators will have imperfect information,
both because of privacy concerns and because regulated parties and
intermediaries will muddle regulators’ data. They may lack the
authority or the political will to respond to regulated parties’ be-
havior. The transparency requirements of a democratic society may
hinder their ability to thwart gamesmanship. Concerns about
unintended consequences may further lower regulators’ willingness
to personalize law. 
Taken together, these dynamics will limit personalized law’s
ability to optimally match facts to legal outcomes. Personalized law
may be a step forward, but it will not produce the utopian outcomes
that some envision.
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INTRODUCTION
Imagine a new technology that lets us measure each individual’s
health perfectly, immediately, and at no cost. Such a technology
would have tremendous potential value; it would enable society to
allocate and distribute medical care in the best possible way. We
could perfectly take into account how sick people are, what benefits
they stand to gain from treatment, and any other factors society
deems relevant when deciding what medical care everyone should
receive and when they should receive it. We could update our
medical care distribution plan in response to new developments—for
example, if someone suddenly takes a turn for the worse, we could
move her up the queue and treat her earlier. Our new technology
would let us maximize the potential gains from medical care in a
way that simply was not possible before its invention.1
This vision sounds utopian. And all is well in utopia—until Bob,
who has a bad liver, realizes that he can move his way up the liver
transplant queue by drinking a bottle of champagne and making his
liver worse. This self-destructive behavior may help Bob if moving
up the queue advantages Bob more than becoming sicker hurts him.
Meanwhile, Bob’s actions make everyone else in the queue unambig-
uously worse off. The Bobs of the world can wreak havoc on our
carefully designed healthcare system—and make care more
expensive to provide, as beneficiaries become sicker than they
otherwise would be. Thus, paradoxically, precisely targeting benefits
can sometimes produce worse outcomes than allocating them in a
simpler, more straightforward way (for example, first come, first
served).2
The utopian care queue that drove Bob to drink exemplifies
“personalized law.” Personalized law is a rapidly growing phenome-
non in legal thought, the subject of a bevy of articles3 and even a
1. Cf. Anthony J. Casey & Anthony Niblett, The Death of Rules and Standards, 92 IND.
L.J. 1401, 1412-16 (2017) (discussing a similar example concerning a diagnostic machine that
predicts the timing of patients’ surgeries).
2. For example, if liver patients receive care sequentially based on the dates on which
they request care, Bob would have no incentive to aggravate his condition.
3. See, e.g., Miriam H. Baer, Evaluating the Consequences of Calibrated Sentencing: A
Response to Professor Kolber, 109 COLUM. L. REV. SIDEBAR 11, 12 (2009); Omri Ben-Shahar
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symposium in the Chicago Law Review.4 The basic idea underlying
personalized law is that regulators can use sophisticated analytical
techniques, large amounts of data, and powerful computers to draw
exacting distinctions between similar (but not identical) circum-
stances and assign them different legal outcomes.5 Individualized
decision rules can be instantaneously distributed to regulated
parties via smartphones, smart cars, and other “smart” devices.6
Thus, the law can weigh all the important facts, instantly analyze
what actions should be permitted, and tell us the results in a clear,
easy-to-understand way: personalized law “will provide ex ante
behavioral prescriptions finely tailored to every possible scenario,”
thereby achieving “all of the benefits of both rules and standards
without the costs of either.”7 At the same time, it will “mitigate
economic and legal inequality”8 and provide “ultimate transpar-
ency.”9 Scholars have asserted that personalized law “will only
increase” over time;10 indeed, they have repeatedly dubbed it “the
wave of the future.”11
& Ariel Porat, Personalizing Negligence Law, 91 N.Y.U. L. REV. 627 (2016); Anthony J. Casey
& Anthony Niblett, Self-Driving Contracts, 43 J. CORP. L. 1 (2017); Anthony J. Casey &
Anthony Niblett, Self-Driving Laws, 66 U. TORONTO L.J. 429 (2016) [hereinafter Casey &
Niblett, Self-Driving Laws]; Casey & Niblett, supra note 1; Caryn Devins, Teppo Felin, Stuart
Kauffman & Roger Koppl, The Law and Big Data, 27 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 357 (2017);
Adam J. Kolber, The Subjective Experience of Punishment, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 182 (2009);
John O. McGinnis & Steven Wasick, Law’s Algorithm, 66 FLA. L. REV. 991 (2014); Ariel Porat
& Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, Personalizing Default Rules and Disclosure with Big Data, 112
MICH. L. REV. 1417 (2014); see also Cass R. Sunstein, Deciding by Default, 162 U. PA. L. REV.
1 (2013); George S. Geis, An Experiment in the Optimal Precision of Contract Default Rules,
80 TUL. L. REV. 1109 (2006); Ian Ayres, Preliminary Thoughts on Optimal Tailoring of
Contractual Rules, 3 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 1, 4-5 n.15 (1993); Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner,
Majoritarian vs. Minoritarian Defaults, 51 STAN. L. REV. 1591, 1593, 1596-1602 (1999).
4. Symposium, Personalized Law, 86 U. CHI. L. REV. 217 (2019).
5. See Casey & Niblett, supra note 1, at 1402-04, 1410, 1414.
6. See id. at 1431-32.
7. Id. at 1403.
8. Philip Hacker & Bilyana Petkova, Reining in the Big Promise of Big Data:
Transparency, Inequality, and New Regulatory Frontiers, 15 NW. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 1,
35 (2017).
9. Andrew Verstein, Privatizing Personalized Law, 86 U. CHI. L. REV. 551, 567 (2019).
10. Devins et al., supra note 3, at 368; see also Thorsten Kaeseberg, The Code-ification of
Law and Its Potential Effects, 2 STAN. J. BLOCKCHAIN L. & POL’Y 232, 236 (2019).
11. Christoph Busch, Implementing Personalized Law: Personalized Disclosures in
Consumer Law and Data Privacy Law, 86 U. CHI. L. REV. 309, 309, 324, 331 (2019); Porat &
Strahlevitz, supra note 3, at 1420, 1476; Sunstein, supra note 3, at 10, 11, 57.
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The personalization revolution is already well under way in
business.12 Companies now have unprecedented levels of informa-
tion about their customers, including where they go, what they view
online, what they purchase, and whom they communicate with.13
They use this information to finely tailor their services and products
to customers’ individual preferences.14 Many of the new economy’s
biggest successes—Google, Amazon, Facebook, Uber, and others—
are built on using this kind of information to provide consumers
with exactly what they want.15
But there are important differences between matching consumers
to products and matching facts to legal outcomes. In particular,
customers want to be directed to their preferred products, so they
generally do not resist such personalization efforts.16 But in many
circumstances, the legal outcome that policymakers prefer will not
be the outcome that the regulated party desires. Accordingly,
regulated parties may react to personalized laws in ways that—from
the perspective of policymakers—are undesirable. These responses
by regulated parties can limit the effectiveness of personalization
efforts, or even thwart them outright.
Businesses have already encountered these dynamics when
personalization is against customers’ interests. For instance, com-
panies have often attempted to use big data to engage in price
discrimination.17 If Uber can tell how much individual consumers
are willing to pay for rides, it can offer lower prices to people who
12. See, e.g., Casey & Niblett, supra note 1, at 1424-25, 1445.
13. Oren Bar-Gill, Algorithmic Price Discrimination When Demand Is a Function of Both
Preferences and (Mis)Perceptions, 86 U. CHI. L. REV. 217, 224-26, 231 (2019).
14. Id. at 225-26, 231.
15. Id. at 225, 231; see Orly Lobel, The Law of the Platform, 101 MINN. L. REV. 87, 94, 96-
99, 102 (2016). Many old economy firms have also made aggressive use of the same techniques
to bolster their businesses, including Target, Proctor & Gamble, and many others. Charles
Duhigg, How Companies Learn Your Secrets, N.Y. TIMES MAG. (Feb. 16, 2012), https://www.
nytimes.com/2012/02/19/magazine/shopping-habits.html [https://perma.cc/9FPN-KXU7].
16. See Aniko Hannak, Gary Soeller, David Lazer, Alan Mislove & Christo Wilson,
Measuring Price Discrimination and Steering on E-commerce Websites, 2014 ACM INTERNET
MEASUREMENT CONF. 305, 306 (2014).
17. Bar-Gill, supra note 13, at 217-19, 224-27; Gerhard Wagner & Horst Eidenmüller,
Down by Algorithms? Siphoning Rents, Exploiting Biases, and Shaping Preferences:
Regulating the Dark Side of Personalized Transactions, 86 U. CHI. L. REV. 581, 585-86 (2019);
see also Hannak et al., supra note 16, at 305-06; Jakub Mikians, La ló Gyarmati, Vijay
Erramilli & Nikolaos Laoutaris, Detecting Price and Search Discrimination on the Internet,
11 ACM WORKSHOP ON HOT TOPICS IN NETWORKS 80 (2012).
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are strongly price-sensitive and higher prices to those who are not.18
This means that consumers have powerful incentives to convince
Uber that they are very price-sensitive—even if they are not—so
that Uber will offer them lower prices.19 For example, consumers
could signal price sensitivity to Uber’s algorithm by checking prices
on their usual routes and then declining to request a ride.20 Amazon
and other retailers have also tried similar price discrimination
strategies and seen similar responses.21 These consumer responses
have made it harder for companies to tell who is truly price sensi-
tive and thus have limited the efficacy of personalized pricing
strategies.22
The potential of personalized law is likewise bounded. Regulated
parties will react to personalized laws by changing their behavior;
they will alter or disguise their circumstances in order to improve
their regulatory treatment.23 They will respond to a given regulatory
regime in unanticipated and undesirable ways; in some instances,
personalized law may produce affirmatively worse outcomes than a
depersonalized legal regime.24 These behaviors will constrain the
law’s ability to draw fine distinctions between circumstances—in
other words, how personalized the law can actually be in prac-
tice—and therefore its ability to achieve optimal outcomes.25
18. See Scott Duke Kominers, Uber’s New Pricing Idea Is Good Theory, Risky Business,




21. See, e.g., Wagner & Eidenmüller, supra note 17, at 585-86, 588-89; Ismat Sarah
Mangla, 3 Tricks to Help You Snag the Best Deals Online, MONEY (Sept. 8, 2014), http://
money.com/money/dynamic-pricing-amazon-best-buy-walmart/ [https://perma.cc/8L8B-8UDQ];
Kyle James, 6 Ways to Avoid Sneaky Online Price Changes, WISEBREAD (Aug. 5, 2015), https:
//www.wisebread.com/6-ways-to-avoid-sneaky-online-price-changes [https://perma.cc/B6FP-
F5M3].
22. See Kominers, supra note 18.
23. Cf. Wagner & Eidenmüller, supra note 17, at 588-91.
24. Cf. Baer, supra note 3, at 13-15, 17-19 (discussing how prisoners could respond to
personalized sentencing).
25. To our knowledge, this is the first paper on personalized law to address these issues
in depth. Porat and Strahilevitz consider the possibility of strategic responses, but they rely
explicitly on the fact that they are only discussing the use of personalized law to create default
rules, not binding legal rules. They note that “expanding personalization beyond waivable
default would magnify the problem” of strategic behavior that we discuss here and that “the
strategic behavior problem would be substantially magnified in a world where most terms
were nonnegotiable.” Porat & Strahilevitz, supra note 3, at 1455-56; see also Casey & Niblett,
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More precisely, we should expect rational actors to change their
behavior whenever they have an incentive to do so. Thus, a
personalized legal regime that perfectly matches circumstances to
legal outcomes will only function as designed if none of the parties
that it governs has an incentive to change its behavior. In econom-
ics terms, the personalized legal regime must be “incentive com-
patible.”26
It is exceedingly difficult to make personalized law incentive-
compatible. That difficulty is further compounded by several
significant constraints on regulators’ ability to personalize law and
to respond to perceived gamesmanship by regulated parties.
The first such constraint is informational. Yes, new technologies
make it easier to gather and analyze data; however, that does not
mean that regulators will have all of the information that they
might want.27 For instance, regulators may be prohibited from
collecting or considering certain types of information due to privacy
or other concerns.28 Even when regulators have data, regulated
parties may intentionally muddle it as a means of thwarting
regulators’ efforts.29
Regulators’ behavior is also constrained by the scope of their
authority.30 Certain types of perceived misbehavior may fall outside
of a regulator’s prescribed jurisdiction.31 Regulators may have
limited ways of penalizing misconduct.32 And even when regulators
have all the legal authority they need, they may lack the political
supra note 1, at 1420 n.63; Anthony J. Casey & Anthony Niblett, A Framework for the New
Personalization of Law, 86 U. CHI. L. REV. 333, 347-48 (2019).
26. See, e.g., ANDREU MAS-COLELL, MICHAEL D. WHINSTON & JERRY R. GREEN,
MICROECONOMIC THEORY 493 (1995).
27. See infra Part III.B.
28. See infra Part III.C.
29. See infra Part III.A.
30. See infra Part III.C.
31. See, e.g., Loving v. IRS, 742 F.3d 1013, 1015 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (holding that the IRS
lacked authority to regulate tax-return preparers); Bus. Roundtable v. SEC, 905 F.2d 406, 407
(D.C. Cir. 1990) (holding that the SEC lacked authority to prohibit securities exchanges from
listing companies that engaged in transactions that disparately reduced the per-share voting
rights of existing common stockholders); see also Lynne L. Dallas & Jordan M. Barry, Long-
Term Shareholders and Time-Phased Voting, 40 DEL. J. CORP. L. 541, 595-96 (2016)
(discussing the D.C. Circuit’s decision in Business Roundtable).
32. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 5000A(g)(2) (curtailing the enforcement options available to the IRS
for enforcing the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act’s “individual mandate”).
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will to use it.33 These issues feed into each other; for example, an
aggressive regulator may trigger a political backlash that reduces
its jurisdiction or its ability to impose penalties.
Democratic oversight requires that regulators maintain a certain
amount of transparency, which creates additional complications.
Transparency can serve as a tonic for concerns about a regulator’s
power; at the same time, greater transparency may facilitate
regulated parties’ attempts to manipulate personalized laws.34
All of these issues interact and overlap in complicated ways that
will fluctuate over time. These dynamics may create substantial
uncertainty for regulators regarding which actions will earn them
plaudits and which will result in a political backlash.35 That concern
will sit atop the uncertainty that regulators face regarding how
regulated parties will react to personalized laws.36 These uncertain-
ties will likely encourage regulators to be conservative in their
efforts to personalize law and respond to gamesmanship.37
These constraints on regulators, combined with regulated parties’
responses to personalized law, will reduce the law’s ability to
optimally match circumstances to outcomes. We do not mean to be
overly dour; personalized law will likely be a valuable tool in the
regulatory tool kit, and it may represent a major step forward in
policy making. But proponents of personalized law should curb their
enthusiasm: the strictures of incentive compatibility will generally
prevent personalized law from producing the utopian outcomes that
some envision. Personalized law may be “the future of law”;38 that
does not make it a panacea.
This Article proceeds as follows. Part I begins with the relevant
background on personalized law. Part II explains how personalized
law will lead to personalized avoidance responses in the form of
false elicitation, false signaling, and moral hazard and illustrates
these phenomena through a combination of both stylized and real-
world examples. Part III turns to the problems that real-world
regulators will face ex ante when shaping the law to deal with these
33. See infra Part III.C.
34. See infra Part III.D.
35. See infra Part III.E.
36. See infra Part III.E.
37. See infra Part III.E.
38. Casey & Niblett, supra note 1, at 1402.
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anticipated avoidance problems and when responding to perceived
misbehavior ex post. This analysis draws upon private actors’ ex-
periences implementing personalized regimes. We then summarize
our conclusions.
I. PERSONALIZED LAW
Laws vary in how much they incorporate specific circumstances.
At one end of the spectrum are blunt, one-size-fits-all rules, such
as a speed limit that everyone must obey.39 At the other end of the
spectrum are laws that calibrate outcomes based on the facts and
circumstances in each case. For example, in the speeding context,
some western states used to permit drivers to travel at any speed
that was “reasonable and proper” under the circumstances.40 Most
laws fall somewhere in between these extremes; for instance, some
states impose varying speed limits for different kinds of motor
vehicles or for nighttime versus daytime driving.41
It is easy to see the appeal of more tailored laws, which can better
match circumstances to legal results. As Professors Anthony Casey
and Anthony Niblett noted, “The idea that the law should be
tailored to better fit the relevant context to which it applies is
obvious and has been around as long as the idea of law itself.”42
At the same time, more finely tailored laws raise their own issues.
The two most common ways of making a law highly responsive to
39. We note that several other articles have used the speed limit example to illustrate the
concept and implications of personalized law. See, e.g., id. at 1404; Verstein, supra note 9, at
564-65.
40. For example, until 1998, Montana had no speed limits on certain highways:
A person ... driving a vehicle ... on a public highway of this state shall drive ...
in a careful and prudent manner and at a rate of speed no greater than is
reasonable and proper ... taking into account the amount and character of traffic,
condition of brakes, weight of vehicle, grade and width of highway, condition of
surface, and freedom of obstruction to the view ahead. The person ... shall drive
the vehicle so as not to unduly or unreasonably endanger the life, limb, property,
or other rights of a person entitled to the use of the ... highway.
MONT. CODE ANN. § 61-8-303(1) (1998).
41. See, e.g., id. § 61-8-303 (2019) (providing faster speed limits on highways in rural
areas, slower speed limits for heavy trucks, and slower speed limits at night); Speed Limits,
MONTANA.GOV, https://www.mdt.mt.gov/visionzero/roads/speedlimits.shtml [https://perma.
cc/C86C-6YF5] (providing a summary table).
42. Casey & Niblett, supra note 25, at 333.
2021] INCENTIVE PROBLEMS IN PERSONALIZED LAW 733
circumstances are to use a broad standard that can flexibly take
into account a wide variety of facts and circumstances or to use
multiple rules that prescribe different outcomes in different
scenarios.43 Each approach has its advantages and disadvantages.44
Standards are flexible, but offer less certainty, which can make
it difficult for people to know whether they are complying with the
law.45 Sticking with the speed limit example, exactly what speed is
“reasonable and proper” for a rural interstate on a dry and sunny
day?46 When people cannot determine what the law actually is and
whether particular conduct violates it, that raises deep concerns
about the rule of law.47
Rules, by contrast, can provide certainty about whether specified
conduct is legal or illegal.48 Theoretically, one can use a large
number of (possibly complicated) rules to match any given set of
circumstances to any desired legal outcome.49 In practice, compli-
cated rules make it harder for people to understand what the law is
and how to comply with it.50 Such laws can also be harder for the
government to administer.51 Imagine a law that defines the speed
limit at any given time using a seventeen-variable equation that
43. Compare Isaac Ehrlich & Richard A. Posner, An Economic Analysis of Legal Rule-
making, 3 J. LEGAL STUD. 257, 257 (1974) (discussing a regime that eschews specific rules
in favor of broad standards), with MONT.CODE ANN.§ 61-8-303 (2019) (denoting a regime with
different rules for different scenarios).
44. See, e.g., WARD FARNSWORTH, THE LEGAL ANALYST: A TOOLKIT FOR THINKING ABOUT
THE LAW 64, 71, 164-68, 171 (2007); Ehrlich & Posner, supra note 43, at 260, 262, 267; Louis
Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42 DUKE L.J. 557, 572-75 (1992);
Cass R. Sunstein, Problems with Rules, 83 CALIF. L. REV. 953, 969, 972, 980-81 (1995);
Frederick Schauer, The Convergence of Rules and Standards, 2003 N.Z. L. REV. 303, 308-10.
45. See, e.g., Kaplow, supra note 44, at 564, 577.
46. See State v. Stanko, 974 P.2d 1132, 1134-35 (Mont. 1998). The court overturned
Stanko’s conviction for speeding and held that section 81-8-303 of the Montana Code
Annotated was unconstitutionally vague. Id. at 1136.
47. See, e.g., Jeremy Waldron, The Rule of Law, STAN. ENCYC. PHIL. (June 22, 2016),
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/rule-of-law/ [https://perma.cc/MB9Q-MVYA]. Open-ended
standards also give more discretion to government decisionmakers, who may then enforce
laws on a discriminatory or corrupt basis. See Sunstein, supra note 44, at 1012.
48. See Casey & Niblett, supra note 1, at 1412.
49. See id. at 1416-17.
50. See id. at 1412-13.
51. To be sure, there are other arguments against more finely tailored laws as well. See,
e.g., Seana Valentine Shiffrin, Inducing Moral Deliberation: On the Occasional Virtues of Fog,
123 HARV. L. REV. 1214, 1217-20 (2010) (arguing that open-ended standards can deliver
justice and fairness).
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incorporates weather conditions, the quality of the car’s braking
system, the time of day, the driver’s reaction times, the density of
animals in the area, and other factors. Such a law could produce a
speed limit that is well calibrated to the conditions present at any
given moment. And, in theory, such a law would tell drivers exactly
how fast they are allowed to drive. In practice, however, drivers
would likely find the law impenetrably difficult to apply, and the
result would be complexity without clarity.52
Recent technological developments suggest new ways for the law
to calibrate outcomes to extremely specific circumstances while still
providing citizens with clear, accessible legal guidance.53 The
Internet of Things promises the ability to rapidly disseminate,
process, and use information.54 At the same time, advances in data
science have made it easier to gather large amounts of data and find
patterns within it, allowing lawmakers to better understand the
consequences of applying a given legal rule to particular circum-
stances.55
This is the heart of “personalized law”—optimizing legal rules to
fit the specific circumstances of each regulated party in order to
produce the best possible outcomes.56 Commentators envision a time
when machines can make real-time decisions about whether certain
types of behaviors are permissible and clearly communicate the
answer in a way that people can understand.57 Consider again the
hypothetical seventeen-variable speed limit, but now imagine that
every car accesses all seventeen variables, performs the relevant
calculations, and displays the resulting speed limit to the driver at
all times. The speed limit is now perfectly clear and, from the
driver’s perspective, simple.
52. There are other concerns as well. Drafting such rules is challenging for policymakers.
In addition, complicated and interrelated rules frequently produce unexpected and undesired
consequences. See, e.g., Jordan M. Barry, On Regulatory Arbitrage, 89 TEX. L. REV. SEE ALSO
69, 73 (2011).
53. Casey & Niblett, supra note 1, at 1405 (stating that personalized law “provides the
certainty of a rule and the calibration of a standard, with none of the decision costs associat-
ed with either”).
54. Id. at 1431-33.
55. See id. at 1424-26.
56. Id. passim.
57. See, e.g., id. at 1423-33.
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Personalized law allows policymakers to carve up the universe of
possible circumstances and assign clear, predictable legal outcomes
in ways that have not been possible historically.58 It enables
regulators “to choose very specific rules that are highly calibrated
to legislative objectives without introducing compliance costs that
would otherwise be associated with such complexity.”59 Without
personalized law, the hypothetical seventeen-variable speed limit
was effectively unavailable; with personalized law, it may be a
tempting option.
To be sure, personalized law does not say what the “best” outcome
is in a given situation.60 Lawmaking entails trade-offs between
competing values, and reasonable people will disagree on how those
trade-offs should be managed.61 Advancements in data science
provide greater clarity on the nature of some of these trade-offs, but
they do not resolve the underlying disagreements about values that
lead different people to prefer particular trade-offs over others. Data
science can provide insight on how raising the speed limit from 65
mph to 70 mph will affect traffic patterns, fuel consumption, and
driver safety. However, it cannot tell you whether it is unfair to
accord some people a higher speed limit than others.62 It cannot tell
you how much weight to give shorter travel times compared to
58. See id. at 1422-23.
59. Id. at 1419.
60. Casey & Niblett, supra note 25, at 336 (“[P]ersonalization technology, for all its
promise, cannot provide [law’s underlying] objective.”); Casey & Niblett, supra note 1, at 1440
(“[L]awmakers of the future must be able to translate society’s values into programmable
objectives for the machines. The task of identifying those values, it seems to us, will remain
a human one.”).
61. See, e.g., Casey & Niblett, supra note 1, at 1437, 1439-40, 1442-43.
62. This question can be thornier than it might initially appear. Richer people will tend
to have higher-quality cars with higher-quality brake systems and other safety features. If
personalized law considers a car’s brakes or other safety features in determining how fast it
should be allowed to travel, the wealthy will have higher effective speed limits on public roads
than the poor. Many might find this objectionable. One could also imagine that drivers might
be accorded a higher speed limit for engaging in (possibly unrelated) meritorious
behavior—people who volunteer their time or eat healthy could get a higher speed limit as a
reward and inducement. This raises concerns about how closely we want human behavior to
be regulated and the potential perils of attaching too many consequences to a regulator’s
determination of merit. See, e.g., Shiffrin, supra note 51, at 1228, 1238; Alexandra Ma, China
Has Started Ranking Citizens with a Creepy ‘Social Credit’ System—Here’s What You Can Do
Wrong, and the Embarrassing, Demeaning Ways They Can Punish You, BUS.INSIDER (Oct. 29,
2018, 12:06 PM), https://www.businessinsider.com/china-social-credit-system-punishments-
and-rewards-explained-2018-4 [https://perma.cc/DZ43-FA6V].
736 WILLIAM & MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 62:723
reduced automotive fatalities.63 It cannot even tell you whether
shorter travel times are a good thing.64
Thus, personalized law is not a new way of resolving long-
standing debates about what our values should be. By contrast, the
potential of personalized law is that it can enable society to achieve
outcomes that it previously could not; it transforms a seventeen-
variable speed limit into a legitimately viable option. Accordingly,
throughout this Article, we will generally put aside the question of
what legal outcomes society should prefer in different situations or
how society should make that decision.65 Instead, we will generally
take society’s ranking of possible outcomes as a given and will
consider how close society can get to its preferred outcome under a
system of personalized law. This is a vital inquiry: gaps between
society’s goals and its legal prescriptions damage millions of people;
conversely, a better fit between social goals and the law could
dramatically improve millions of lives.
To see the transformative potential of personalized law, imagine
that a new diagnostic machine (the “Medical Machine”) appears in
doctors’ offices.66 The Medical Machine takes into account relevant
facts about Medicare patients—their medical history, test results,
symptoms, and so on—as well as all published medical scholarship.
It then uses this information to determine which medical procedures
should be available to each Medicare patient.67 The Medical
Machine makes superior decisions, does so rapidly, and communi-
cates them to the doctor in an easy-to-understand way. The Medical
Machine is so accurate that a doctor who fails to offer its prescribed
treatments to the patient, or who offers a course of treatment that
63. Cf. FED. HIGHWAY ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T OF TRANSP., CRASH COSTS FOR HIGHWAY SAFETY
ANALYSIS (2018), https://safety.fhwa.dot.gov/hsip/docs/fhwasa17071.pdf [https://perma.cc/
B98R-6DTJ].
64. For example, a hypothetical society might want to discourage driving—perhaps to
reduce pollution, to increase density and reduce sprawl, or to encourage people to get more
exercise by walking or biking. It might therefore prefer that car trips take longer as a way of
raising the time cost of driving, thus discouraging it.
65. Cf. Kenneth J. Arrow, A Difficulty in the Concept of Social Welfare, 58 J. POL. ECON.
328, 328-34 (1950) (discussing the difficulties and indeterminacies of democratic decision-
making).
66. Cf. Casey & Niblett, supra note 1, at 1412-16 (discussing a similar example).
67. We assume that patients still get to choose whether they want a particular procedure
that is available to them.
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is not recommended, exposes herself to liability for malpractice.68
Moreover, the government will not pay for any treatment the
Medical Machine does not recommend, on the grounds that the costs
exceed the benefits. The Medical Machine would have effectively
replaced all of the rules and standards that currently govern med-
ical malpractice and Medicare benefits with a system of personal-
ized law.69
It is easy to see the theoretical advantages of such a system.
Unlike our current system, the Medical Machine always produces
clear answers as to what the doctor should do. Moreover, those
answers can be as finely tailored as one might want: The only entity
that must understand the rules assigning medical care is the
Medical Machine. No specific individual—neither the doctor, nor the
patient, nor even a court reviewing what the doctor did—needs to
understand the underlying process that determines medical care.
That process can therefore be as complicated, and outcomes can be
as personalized, as policymakers desire.
Some commentators have suggested that personalized law will
indeed be able to match almost all factual circumstances to the best
possible legal outcomes.70 For example, Professors Casey and
Niblett, who have become prominent scholars of personalized law,
have stated that personalized law will cover “all possible contexts”
68. Cf. Casey & Niblett, supra note 1, at 1405 (“[F]ailure to use the technology will become
a per se violation of a legal standard.”).
69. One could similarly imagine that the Medical Machine would be programmed with the
coverage information contained within private insurance contracts or that private insurance
contracts would base coverage decisions on the Medical Machine’s determinations as well.
Thus, the Medical Machine might subsume additional areas of health law. Cf. id. at 1446-47
(describing how technological revolutions can impact “all spheres of law”).
70. See Brett Frischmann, Algorithm and Blues: The Tyranny of the Coming Smart-Tech
Utopia, SCI. AM. BLOG NETWORK (July 30, 2018), https://blogs.scientificamerican.com/obser
vations/algorithm-and-blues-the-tyranny-of-the-coming-smart-tech-utopia/ [https://perma.
cc/G7ZN-KX9F] (“These claims [about personalized law] are rooted deeply in a smart-tech
utopian vision that builds from prior techno-utopian visions ... as well as from economic-
utopian visions.... Smart-tech utopianism is driving social and technological progress in the
21st century, yet it seems doomed to end in tyranny.”); cf. Lloyd Hitoshi Mayer, The Promises
and Perils of Using Big Data to Regulate Nonprofits, 94 WASH. L. REV. 1281, 1281 (2019)
(“For the optimist, government use of ‘Big Data’ involves the careful collection of information
from numerous sources.... [And] expert analysis of those data to reveal previously un-
discovered patterns ... [, which] revolutionizes the regulation of criminal behavior, education,
health care, and many other areas.”); Porat & Strahilevitz, supra note 3, at 1422 (“The ills
of personalization, it turns out, may be countered by even more personalization.”).
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via “a vast catalog of legal rules—each of which is tailored to best
achieve the objective in a specific scenario.”71 Personalized laws “will
be highly calibrated to policy objectives with no chance of judges
introducing bias or incompetence.”72 These “laws will automatically
and rapidly adapt to the circumstances, optimizing according to the
objective of the law.”73 They will “be able to take into account” laws’
effects across many dimensions and design the legal regime that
produces “a global optimum,” as defined by policymakers.74 Casey
and Niblett worry that personalized law’s purportedly near-perfect
power to tailor legal outcomes to factual scenarios will be so alluring
that it will override any and all countervailing concerns about the
technology:
One might think that if the ... concerns [raised by personalized
law] are great enough, lawmakers will reject the move to
[personalized law]. We do not see this happening. The growth of
predictive technology is robust. The lure of accuracy (“getting
things right”) and the regulated actors’ desire for certainty are
powerful forces that will dominate political and legal debates.75
Some other scholars have taken a similarly rosy view of the
future of personalized law. Professor Cass Sunstein has dubbed it
“the wave of the future,”76 and several other prominent scholars
have predicted that personalized law “will only increase” over
time.77 By moving decisions from inscrutable human judgment to
objective algorithms and calculations, personalized law will provide
“ultimate transparency.”78 In addition, personalized law will “mit-
igat[e] ... economic and legal inequality.”79 In the views of some
71. Casey & Niblett, supra note 1, at 1411-12. But cf. id. at 1410 (“[T]he calibration [of
personalized law] need not be perfect, it only needs to be better than the calibration associated
with the alternatives of legislated rules and adjudicated standards.”).
72. Id. at 1410.
73. Id. at 1437.
74. Id. at 1437-38.
75. Id. at 1445. Casey and Niblett worry that, as a result, “[t]he more nuanced con-
siderations” that they discuss in their work will “be sidelined.” Id.
76. Sunstein, supra note 3, at 57.
77. Devins et al., supra note 3, at 368; see also Kaeseberg, supra note 10, at 235.
78. Verstein, supra note 9, at 567.
79. Hacker & Petkova, supra note 8, at 2.
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commentators, even “[t]he ills of personalization ... may be coun-
tered by even more personalization.”80
Yet even in the idealized world of our Medical Machine, there are
limits on how well society can match factual circumstances to legal
outcomes. Governance—by public or private parties—is a dynamic
process: policymakers issue rules, and regulated parties change
their behavior in response.81 Personalizing law does not eliminate
that core dynamic; to the contrary, it will likely intensify it.82 Thus,
gamesmanship by regulated parties will impose limits on personal-
ized law. That is the focus of this Article, to which we now turn.
II. INDIVIDUAL RESPONSES TO PERSONALIZED LAW
Consider again our hypothetical Medical Machine. In a world in
which people simply accept its decisions, a carefully programmed
Medical Machine could produce socially optimal results: Policymak-
ers could encode any desired decision-making rule into the Medical
Machine. The healthcare system, guided by the Medical Machine,
would then supply each patient with the exact medical care that
society deems appropriate.
In practice, people have strong incentives to alter their treatment
under the Medical Machine. These incentives underlie three broad
classes of problems that have been well explored in the economics
literature: elicitation, signaling, and moral hazard. We consider
each in turn.
A. Elicitation
To tailor responses to different circumstances, one must ascer-
tain what those circumstances are. One way to do this is to simply
ask people to identify their characteristics.83 Self-identification can
80. Porat & Strahilevitz, supra note 3, at 1422.
81. See, e.g., Jordan M. Barry & Paul L. Caron, Tax Regulation, Transportation Inno-
vation, and the Sharing Economy, 82 U. CHI. L. REV. DIALOGUE 69, 72-74 (2015).
82. See infra Part II.
83. One might argue that the rise of big data has made this information gathering
strategy somewhat less important. However, much of the “big data” that companies use now,
and that regulations would presumably use in the future, is self-reported data. For example,
consider COMPAS, a widely used software program that uses a wide range of data to predict
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work well when a characteristic is both easily verifiable and pos-
itively associated with outcomes.
For example, if an employer wants to hire students with high
grades, it is sufficient to allow students to provide their transcripts.
Students with high grades will happily do so84: These students wish
to make themselves appear as attractive to employers as possible.
They know that employers value high grades and want employers
to know that they possess them. Similarly, if the government wants
to provide tax credits to taxpayers with minor children, such
taxpayers will be happy to identify themselves, as they reap a direct
monetary benefit from doing so.85
Voluntary disclosures can work in certain applications of the
Medical Machine as well. For example, if asked, people might be
willing to share whether a particular disease runs in their family,
if doing so enables the Medical Machine to make more accurate
diagnoses. Similarly, asking patients whether they would like to
receive medications that are unpleasant to ingest and only offer
benefits if a patient is truly sick—such as chemotherapy drugs or
syrup of ipecac—is likely to elicit an honest response.
But in many cases, patients will have incentives to misreport
their circumstances. One way in which this could arise is with
respect to health conditions that, if present, will reduce the level of
care that a patient will receive now. For example, there is a chronic
criminal defendants’ likelihood of committing crimes in the future. COMPAS relies, in part,
on defendants’ responses to survey questions. See, e.g., Julia Angwin, Jeff Larson, Surya
Mattu & Lauren Kirchner, Machine Bias, PROPUBLICA (May 23, 2016), https://www.pro
publica.org/article/machine-bias-risk-assessments-in-criminal-sentencing [https://perma.cc/
CXN8-272F] (listing a number of such questions, including: “Was one of your parents ever
sent to jail or prison?”, “How many of your friends/acquaintances are taking drugs illegally?”,
“How often did you get in fights while at school?”, “[Does] a hungry person ha[ve] a right to
steal[?]” and “If people make [you] angry or lose [your] temper, [can you] be dangerous?”).
84. The dynamics may be such that the market unravels and all students disclose. For
example, if only the top 10 percent of students disclose their grades, rational employers will
assume that a nondisclosing student is in the middle of the nondisclosing group. A student
near the top GPA of the nondisclosing group (for example, at the 80th percentile) will thus
find it in her interest to disclose. As additional relatively high-performing students disclose,
the average GPA of the nondisclosing students drops. This encourages the highest-performing
remaining nondisclosers to disclose, repeating the cycle. Ultimately, all students may be
forced to disclose their grades, lest employers infer that their grades are worse than they
actually are. But for purposes of this example, it suffices that students with high grades
disclose.
85. See I.R.C. § 24.
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shortage of kidneys available for transplant in the United States.86
Thousands of people on the waiting list for kidneys die each year,
waiting for one to become available.87 In an attempt to mitigate the
human cost of this shortage, assume that policymakers program the
Medical Machine to consider potential kidney recipients’ expected
post-transplant longevity when allocating kidneys. Knowing this, a
candidate for a transplant might not disclose a family history of any
serious illness—diabetes, lung cancer, Huntington’s disease—that
might reduce her chances of receiving a kidney transplant now. This
would limit the information available to the Medical Machine,
reducing its ability to distinguish between circumstances.
One might protest that this example is unrealistic because the
Medical Machine would have other ways of getting that information.
Perhaps it could access the medical files of a patient’s parents or
other relatives to directly check the incidence of disease in the
family.88
However, there are other types of information that cannot be
gleaned in this manner. For instance, it is difficult for an outside
observer to tell whether a soft-tissue injury is painful.89 Of course,
the patient will know, but because patients who are not in pain may
still desire medications (such as oxycodone, morphine, or fentanyl),
relying on patients’ assertions alone is problematic.90
86. See, e.g., Benny Evangelista, Facebook Hopes to Expand Organ Donation Awareness,
SFGATE (Aug. 6, 2012, 2:47 PM), https://www.sfgate.com/business/article/Facebook-hopes-to-
expand-organ-donation-awareness-3525917.php [https://perma.cc/P4B4-TUVU].
87. See, e.g., Organ Donation and Transplantation Statistics, NAT’L KIDNEY FOUND.,
https://www.kidney.org/news/newsroom/factsheets/Organ-Donation-and-Transplantation-
Stats [https://perma.cc/76EL-DXDK].
88. Alternatively, perhaps the Medical Machine could glean the required information from
the patient’s DNA, assuming it is available to the machine.
89. See, e.g., Ephrat Livni, How Do You Prove Soft Tissue Injury?, FINDLAW (May 25,
2016, 6:59 AM), https://blogs.findlaw.com/injured/2016/05/how-do-you-prove-soft-tissue-injury.
html [https://perma.cc/9AKN-ZZKL] (“Soft tissue injuries are like feelings—they’re real and
they hurt but they can be invisible and not everyone believes in them. For these reasons,
proving this kind of injury can be difficult.”).
90. See, e.g., Pamela L. Pentin, Commentary, Drug Seeking or Pain Crisis? Responsible
Prescribing of Opioids in the Emergency Department, 15 AMA J. ETHICS 410, 411-12 (2013);
Harrison Cook, 48% of Hospitals See Patients with Drug-Seeking Behavior Daily, Survey
Finds, BECKER’S HOSP. REV. (Oct. 17, 2018), https://www.beckershospitalreview.com/
opioids/48-of-hospitals-see-patients-with-drug-seeking-behavior-daily-survey-finds.html
[https://perma.cc/B8US-9WB4].
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Similar concerns about how accurately individuals report their
circumstances arise in many other contexts. Consider securities law,
which distinguishes between investors who are deemed to be
sophisticated enough to fend for themselves (“accredited investors”)
and those who require more protection.91 To simplify, companies are
allowed to sell certain securities to accredited investors that they
are not allowed to sell to other members of the public.92 In January
2020, the SEC issued a proposed rule that would expand the
definition of accredited investor.93 In doing so, it specifically called
for comment on whether individuals should be able to qualify as
accredited investors simply by “self-certify[ing] that they have the
requisite financial sophistication.”94
However, simply asking an investor whether he is sophisticated,
or whether he appreciates the risks of an investment, is unlikely to
elicit truthful and accurate responses. First, people who know that
they are not sophisticated have incentives to falsely report that they
are: would-be investors want to purchase the securities in question,
and disclosing their lack of sophistication would prevent them from
doing so.95
Second, many people may incorrectly believe that they are so-
phisticated investors.96 Robert Citron, the former treasurer of
Orange County, provides a famous example.97 He invested the
county’s funds in derivatives with risks that he did not fully
91. See 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.501, 230.506 (2019); see also 15 U.S.C. § 80a-3(c)(7) (adding the
similar concept of “qualified” investors).
92. For a more fulsome explanation, see SEC, UPDATED INVESTOR BULLETIN:ACCREDITED
INVESTORS, INVESTOR.GOV (Jan. 31, 2019), https://www.investor.gov/introduction-investing/
general-resources/news-alerts/alerts-bulletins/investor-bulletins/updated-3 [https://perma.cc/
L7VQ-95QC].
93. See Amending the “Accredited Investor” Definition, 85 Fed. Reg. 2574, 2574 (Jan. 15,
2020) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 230, 240).
94. Id. at 2584.
95. Cf. BETHANY MCLEAN & JOE NOCERA, ALL THE DEVILS ARE HERE: THE HIDDEN
HISTORY OF THE FINANCIAL CRISIS 111-18 (2010) (describing how investors with regulatory
incentives to hold investments with high credit ratings engaged in “rating shopping” to
pressure ratings agencies to rate assets they wanted to buy more highly).
96. See generally Justin Kruger & David Dunning, Unskilled and Unaware of It: How
Difficulties in Recognizing One’s Own Incompetence Lead to Inflated Self-Assessments, 77 J.
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCH. 1121 (1999).
97. FRANK PARTNOY, INFECTIOUS GREED: HOW DECEIT AND RISK CORRUPTED THE
FINANCIAL MARKETS 112-16 (2009).
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appreciate.98 When warned (repeatedly) that he was taking on great
risks, he argued that critics simply did not understand the county’s
investment strategy.99 His bets paid off for years before luck turned
against him and the county, resulting in the largest municipal
bankruptcy in U.S. history to that point.100
Testimony later revealed how out of his depth Citron was.101
Witnesses “testified that Citron, the ‘financial wizard,’ had only
seventh-grade-level math ability and performed so poorly on tests
that he ‘bordered on brain damaged.’”102 There was also testimony
“that he suffered from a form of dementia and often relied on a mail-
order astrologer and a psychic for his interest rate forecasts.”103
B. Signaling
Another way of identifying individuals’ characteristics is to infer
them from their behaviors.104 This inferential method looms
particularly large in current thinking around personalized law.105
The basic logic is that examining regulated parties’ behavior can
give regulators a more accurate picture than directly elicited an-
swers provide.106 This argument has some force; it is one thing to
98. Id. at 116.
99. Id.
100. See JOHNE.MARTHINSEN, RISK TAKERS:USES AND ABUSES OF FINANCIAL DERIVATIVES
109-14 (3d ed. 2018).
101. Id. at 136.
102. Id.
103. Id.; see also id. at 136 n.34 (“For the record, Citron’s psychic told him that December
1994 would be a bad month. The psychic was correct.”). In another, more recent example,
Taylor Caudle joined a group called “Big Pump,” devoted to cryptocurrency “pump-and-dump”
operations—that is, organized efforts to raise the price of an asset temporarily and then sell
the asset before its price drops. Shane Shifflett & Paul Vigna, Some Traders Are Talking Up
Cryptocurrencies, Then Dumping Them, Costing Others Millions, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 5, 2018,
9:00 AM), https://www.wsj.com/graphics/cryptocurrency-schemes-generate-big-coin/ [https://
perma.cc/9DN8-HGMT]. Caudle participated in an attempt but failed to sell in time and “lost
$5,000 in about 30 seconds.” Id. He had maxed out his credit card to acquire the $5,000. Id.;
Matt Levine, Crypto Pumps Are Just for Fun, BLOOMBERG (Aug. 6, 2018, 7:45 AM), https://
www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2018-08-06/crypto-pumps-are-just-for-fun [https://perma.
cc/7VND-Y2LH].
104. See, e.g., Charles Duhigg, What Does Your Credit-Card Company Know About You?,
N.Y. TIMES MAG. (May 12, 2009), http://www.nytimes.com/2009/05/17/magazine/17credit-
t.html [https://perma.cc/UE7S-S7MF].
105. See generally Casey & Niblett, Self-Driving Laws, supra note 3.
106. See id. at 431-32. It would also avoid the transaction costs involved in asking people
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claim you are politically engaged and another to keep your televi-
sion tuned to C-SPAN for two hours a day.107
But here, too, regulated parties’ responses to personalized law
create problems. The same incentives that motivate people to falsely
report their characteristics will also motivate them to change their
behavior in order to disguise their true characteristics.
In economics, taking costly actions in order to convince others
that you possess certain characteristics is known as “signaling.”108
Under a system of personalized law, regulated parties will have
tremendous incentives to send signals—including false ones—to
improve their regulatory treatment.
The false signaling problem is not new to personalized law;
whenever the law gives different treatment to different groups,
members of one group may try to disguise themselves as the other.
However, personalized law can exacerbate this problem. The
premise and promise of personalized law is that it can create more
varied outcomes based on finer distinctions across people and
scenarios.109 This means that the range of available legal rules is
larger, and hence the potential benefits of false signals are larger
too. And because fine changes in perceived individual characteristics
can produce different legal rules is larger, the potential payoff from
a small shift in how an individual is perceived is likely to be larger
as well.110
Returning to our Medical Machine example, suppose that there
are two types of artificial joints for knee and hip replacements,
Acme and Beta. Assume that Acme joints function better than Beta
joints but that they are also more expensive. Suppose that the
about their preferences.
107. Cf. Porat & Strahilevitz, supra note 3, at 1437-38 (discussing how private firms often
have greater confidence in big data based on purchasing behavior rather than on survey data,
on the ground that the subjects of the data are less likely to manipulate the former).
108. MAS-COLELL ET AL., supra note 26, at 450-51.
109. Casey & Niblett, supra note 25, at 335 (“As technologies ... reduce the costs of
discovering and communicating the relevant personal context for a law to achieve its purpose,
the goal of a well-tailored, accurate, and highly contextualized law is becoming more
achievable. And that is the ‘new’ personalization of law.”).
110. However, it may be more difficult (or costly) to send a false signal under a personalized
legal system than a depersonalized one (for example, a technologically advanced implemen-
tation of personalized law might be better at detecting false signals). Thus, a shift from a
depersonalized legal rule to a personalized one could either increase or decrease the amount
and cost of false signaling overall, depending on the specific circumstances.
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Medical Machine judges that the additional cost of an Acme joint is
merited only for those patients with active lifestyles; avid joggers
and hikers are eligible to receive Acme joints, while other patients
are eligible only for Beta joints.111 Individuals experiencing joint
pain may then try to create a data record suggesting that they love
jogging and hiking—trekking up mountains and posting pictures on
Facebook, buying a Fitbit and challenging their friends, jogging past
the local hospital each morning—in order to qualify for the better
and more expensive treatment.112
These same dynamics apply in many other legal contexts as
well. Students with certain disabilities are entitled to longer
amounts of time to take tests,113 including standardized tests,114
college exams,115 and bar exams.116 But having more time to take
111. Doctors currently select among different joints based on patients’ anticipated activities
post-replacement. See, e.g., Lesley Alderman, Getting a New Knee or Hip? Do It Right the First
Time, N.Y.TIMES (July 2, 2010), https://www.nytimes.com/2010/07/03/health/03patient.html
[https://perma.cc/A67V-SZAA]. The same concept extends easily to many possible medical
interventions. For example, patients with joint problems might be eligible for costly surgery
or less costly but less effective medications or physical therapies. Cf. Casey & Niblett, supra
note 1, at 1412-16 (discussing the use of predictive technology in medical diagnoses).
112. They could also create false signals through fraud—for example, hiring someone to
hike while wearing the patient’s Fitbit, or hacking into Fitbit’s database and changing their
records. See Sean O’Toole, How to Cheat on Fitbit Convincingly. Spoiler: It Involves String.,
GROUPON (Dec. 27, 2018), https://www.groupon.com/articles/how-to-cheat-on-fitbit [https://
perma.cc/GYC8-DVL6]; Jen Wieczner, Fitbit Users Are Finding Creative Ways to Cheat,
FORTUNE (June 10, 2016, 1:40 PM), https://fortune.com/2016/06/10/fitbit-hack-cheat/ [https://
perma.cc/SK3D-EH4K]. However, this can be combatted by laws against fraud. Cf., e.g., CAL.
UNEMP. INS. CODE §§ 2116, 2122 (West 2004) (making the filing of false claims for disability
insurance, or helping others file such claims, a criminal offense punishable by fine or
imprisonment).
113. See 42 U.S.C. § 12189 (requiring examinations be offered “in a place or manner
accessible to persons with disabilities”); 28 C.F.R. § 35.130 (2018) (discussing prohibitions
against discrimination toward individuals with disabilities).
114. See, e.g., National Extended Time/Timing Code 6 Frequently Asked Questions, ACT,
https://www.act.org/content/dam/act/unsecured/documents/FAQ-TAA-Changes.pdf [https://
perma.cc/V58T-ENEP]; Extended Time Accommodation, COLL. BD., https://accommodations.
collegeboard.org/typical-accommodations/time [https://perma.cc/AGJ7-U4L9]; LSAC Policy on
Accommodations for Test Takers with Disabilities, LAW SCH. ADMISSION COUNCIL, https://
www.lsac.org/lsat/lsac-policy-accommodations-test-takers-disabilities [https://perma.cc/T598-
YC4A].
115. See, e.g., Exam Accommodations, HARV. UNIV., https://aeo.fas.harvard.edu/accommo
dations-services/academic/exam-accommodations [https://perma.cc/SQD5-3UMG]; Receiving
Test Accommodations, UNIV. OF MICH., https://lsa.umich.edu/tac/students/steps-to-using-the-
tac.html [https://perma.cc/HG8Y-MZQQ].
116. See, e.g., Test Accommodations for the New York Bar Exam and the New York Law
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tests is also beneficial to students without disabilities,117 and some
students falsely present themselves as having a disability in order
to secure extra time.118 In this context, false signaling can include
spending time and money on medically unnecessary doctor’s visits,
as well as changing one’s behavior during such visits to mislead
doctors.119 Likewise, workers who become disabled are entitled to
payments from the federal government.120 Some individuals falsely
present themselves as disabled in order to collect these benefits.121
Similarly, sincerely held religious beliefs must be accommodated in
Exam, N.Y.STATEBD.L.EXAM’RS, https://www.nybarexam.org/ADA/ADA.htm [https://perma.
cc/P4ZQ-WLJC]; Requesting Testing Accommodations, STATEBAR OF CAL., http://www.calbar.
ca.gov/Admissions/Examinations/Requesting-Testing-Accommodations [https://perma.cc/
EMT2-FMUQ].
117. See, e.g., William D. Henderson, The LSAT, Law School Exams, and Meritocracy: The
Surprising and Undertheorized Role of Test-Taking Speed, 82 TEX. L. REV. 975, 985 & nn.49-
50 (2004) (collecting sources discussing “speediness” as a factor in the LSAT; that is, that the
test is designed so that many test-takers do not finish each section).
118. This practice featured prominently in the recent college admissions scandal. See
Associated Press, College Admissions Scandal Shows How People Exploited Rules for Disabled
Students, MARKETWATCH (Mar. 13, 2019, 2:55 PM), https://www.marketwatch.com/story/
exam-rules-for-disabled-students-were-abused-in-admissions-scandal-2019-03-13 [https://
perma.cc/S4R5-ZWJC]; Doree Lewak, Rich Parents Are Using Doctor’s Notes to Help Kids
Cheat the SATs, N.Y. POST (May 2, 2018, 8:37 PM), https://nypost.com/2018/05/02/rich-par
ents-are-using-doctors-notes-to-help-kids-cheat-the-sats/ [https://perma.cc/XB5U-TKX3]; Eliza
Shapiro & Dana Goldstein, Is the College Cheating Scandal the ‘Final Straw’ for Standardized
Tests?, N.Y.TIMES (Mar. 14, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/03/14/us/sat-act-cheating-
college-admissions.html [https://perma.cc/A8SM-D9V9].
119. See, e.g., Dana Goldstein & Jugal K. Patel, Need Extra Time on Tests? It Helps to Have
Cash, N.Y.TIMES (July 30, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/07/30/us/extra-time-504-sat-
act.html [https://perma.cc/KGL2-S9C7] (describing charges of $3,000-$10,000 for these
services, which can take as long as ten hours, and how a student was advised to “‘be stupid’
during the psychologist’s evaluation”); Lewak, supra note 118; Jake Tapper, Dan Morris &
Lara Setrakian, Does Loophole Give Rich Kids More Time on SAT?, ABCNEWS (Mar. 30, 2006,
5:10 PM), https://abcnews.go.com/Nightline/loophole-give-rich-kids-time-sat/story?id=1787712
[https://perma.cc/B926-U2CV].
120. See SOC. SEC. ADMIN., PUB. NO. 05-10029, DISABILITY BENEFITS (2019), https://www.
ssa.gov/pubs/EN-05-10029.pdf [https://perma.cc/MK4U-MEAV].
121. See, e.g., SOC. SEC. ADMIN., PUB. NO. 31-231, AGENCY FINANCIAL REPORT: FISCAL YEAR
2017, at 125, 152 (2017) (estimating $4.3 billion in disability benefit overpayments in 2016);
OFF. OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., “20/20" and Disability Fraud: Seeing Is Believing, SSA BLOG
(Jan. 27, 2015), https://oig.ssa.gov/newsroom/blog/jan27-disability-fraud [https://perma.cc/
F99R-H9E4] (discussing cases, including one in which a worker claimed to be blind and
unable to work, but actually “could see well enough to work, drive,” operate a water-ski boat,
and run two businesses); Man Claiming To Be Too Blind to Drive Seen Behind the Wheel, ABC
NEWS (May 22, 2015), https://abcnews.go.com/2020/video/man-claiming-blind-drive-wheel-
28132362 [https://perma.cc/3N58-72HL].
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school,122 in the workplace,123 or even in prison.124 Some people
misrepresent their religious beliefs as a result.125 Other examples
abound.126
A personalized disability benefits regime might well do a better
job of matching outcomes to facts than our current system does, and
we note that the government has been making some modest moves
in this direction.127 But so long as disability benefits are attractive
to those without disabilities, there will be incentives to send false
signals, and personalized law will not be able to catch them all.
More disturbingly, there are other arenas in which personalizing
law may make outcomes affirmatively worse. For example, consider
income taxes. One of the chief arguments for low tax rates is that
taxes can distort economic behavior and create deadweight loss128:
Suppose people will pay fifty dollars for a piano lesson from Jane,
and that Jane is willing to teach if she nets at least thirty-five
dollars per lesson.129 If Jane is subject to a 40 percent tax on her
122. See, e.g., A.A. ex rel. Betenbaugh v. Needville Indep. Sch. Dist., 701 F. Supp. 2d 863
(S.D. Tex. 2009), aff’d, 611 F.3d 248 (5th Cir. 2010).
123. See, e.g., Davis v. Fort Bend County, 765 F.3d 480, 485-86 (5th Cir. 2014); Adeyeye v.
Heartland Sweeteners, LLC, 721 F.3d 444, 448-49 (7th Cir. 2013).
124. See, e.g., Andreola v. Doyle, 260 F. App’x 935, 935 (7th Cir. 2008); Ford v. McGinnis,
352 F.3d 582, 588 (2d Cir. 2003).
125. See generally Nathan S. Chapman, Adjudicating Religious Sincerity, 92 WASH.L.REV.
1185 (2017); Steven D. Smith, The Case of the Exemption Claimants: Religion, Conscience, and
Identity, 2019 BYU L. REV. 339.
126. See generally Martha A. Field, Problems of Proof in Conscientious Objector Cases, 120
U. PA. L. REV. 870 (1972) (describing false claims of conscientious objection).
127. See, e.g., Robert Pear, On Disability and on Facebook? Uncle Sam Wants to Watch
What You Post, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 10, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/03/10/us/politics/
social-security-disability-trump-facebook.html [https://perma.cc/E9WN-2KHS]; Denise Brodey,
Disability Advocates Poke Holes in White House Plan to Snoop on Facebook Pages for
Disability Fraud, FORBES (Mar. 11, 2019, 4:29 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/denise
brodey/2019/03/11/disability-advocates-poke-holes-in-white-house-plan-to-snoop-on-facebook-
pages-for-disability-fraud/#107c0a535880 [https://perma.cc/7AFR-Z78Y].
128. See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 653-55 (8th ed. 2011); HAL
R. VARIAN, INTERMEDIATE MICROECONOMICS: A MODERN APPROACH 304 (Jack Repcheck ed.,
8th ed. 2010) (“[F]rom the economist’s viewpoint, the real cost of the tax is that the output has
been reduced.”); cf. Jordan M. Barry, The Emerging Consensus for Cutting the Corporate
Income Tax Rate, 18 CHAP. L. REV. 19, 22-24 (2014) (discussing the economic effects of a
reduced corporate income tax rate).
129. Equivalently, her reservation price is thirty-five dollars. See VARIAN, supra note 128,
at 4. For simplicity, we assume Jane has no direct costs, such as materials. The example can
easily be modified to address such issues, however.
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income, she will net only thirty dollars per lesson after taxes.130
Knowing this, she will not give lessons. This is bad for Jane and her
would-be piano students, as they cannot complete a transaction that
would make each of them better off. Crucially, it is also bad for the
government; because Jane earns no income, the government collects
no tax. Subjecting Jane to the 40 percent income tax has thus made
everyone, including the government, worse off.
One could imagine a personalized tax regime that calibrates
individuals’ tax rates based on how responsive their behavior is to
taxation. If the law could determine Jane’s after-tax reservation
price for giving piano lessons, it could subject her to a 20 percent tax
rate instead of the 40 percent tax rate to which other taxpayers are
subject.131 Jane would then give lessons for fifty dollars, keeping
forty dollars for herself and paying ten dollars in taxes.132 Jane, her
student, and the government would all be better off.133 One could
extend this same idea beyond the income tax; estate taxes, gift
taxes, sales taxes, payroll taxes, excise taxes, and property taxes all
jump to mind.134
However, such personalized tax laws would give taxpayers
tremendous incentives to convince the government that they are
130. Jane is paid fifty dollars for teaching, then pays twenty dollars in taxes (40% × $50
= $20), leaving her with thirty dollars ($50 - $20 = $30).
131. There are other arguments against doing this, such as horizontal equity-based
arguments, and we will return to them in Part III.
132. Any tax rate below 30 percent will also induce Jane to give piano lessons. From a
social planner’s perspective, a 29 percent tax rate would likely be preferable to the 20 percent
posited in the text, as it would raise more revenue and raise fewer horizontal equity concerns.
133. Jane would be better off because she would receive forty dollars, which is more than
her thirty-five dollar reservation price, leaving her with five dollars of surplus. Previously, she
gave no lessons and received no surplus. Her student is better off because he gets piano
lessons, which he values more than the fifty dollars he pays for them; previously, he did not
receive lessons. The government is better off because it gets ten dollars of tax revenue;
previously, it got zero. To the extent that the government cares about the welfare of Jane and
her student, it benefits in that way as well.
134. See, e.g., Richard Arnott & Petia Petrova, The Property Tax as a Tax on Value:
Deadweight Loss, 13 INT’L TAX & PUB. FIN. 241, 255, 262 (2006) (applying similar theories to
property taxes); Wojciech Kopczuk & Joel Slemrod, The Impact of the Estate Tax on Wealth
Accumulation and Avoidance Behavior, in RETHINKING ESTATE AND GIFT TAXATION 299-300
(William G. Gale, James R. Hines, Jr. & Joel Slemrod eds., 2001) (noting the impact of estate
taxes on wealth accumulation); see also Matthew A. Seligman, Personalized Choice of Private
Law 38-39 (Cardozo Legal Stud., Rsch. Paper No. 596, 2020), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=3493093 [https://perma.cc/XXZ6-QFZV] (suggesting a personalized
carbon tax).
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extremely tax-sensitive, even if they are not.135 Taxpayers might
falsely signal this by buying books on tax planning, buying tax-
favored investments such as state and municipal bonds,136 joining
anti-tax groups, or simply adjusting the amount they work as their
tax rates change.137 To the extent that these efforts succeed at
convincing the government to lower one’s tax rate, they move reality
away from the optimal outcome contemplated by the personalized
law system.138
Even if the law consistently sees through false signals, false
signaling behavior remains problematic. Signaling efforts are likely
to be costly for the individual engaging in them and for society at
large.139 Thus, encouraging such behavior is still a concern in and of
itself.140 Society may well be better off under a system that lacks
personalization.
For instance, in our income tax example, if Jane purposefully
lowers her work efforts in an attempt to convey that she is sensitive
to tax, that means Jane is turning down work that others are happy
to pay for and that she is truly willing to perform, net of taxes.141
135. An analogous problem arises when governments (often state and local ones) use tax
incentives to attract businesses. Businesses will want to make their relocation plans appear
highly sensitive to their tax treatment, even if they are not, in order to secure the greatest
possible tax benefits. See, e.g., Alexander Klemm, Causes, Benefits, and Risks of Business Tax
Incentives (IMF Working Paper WP/09/21, 2009), https://www.imf.org/external/ pubs/ft/wp/
2009/wp0921.pdf [https://perma.cc/YF5M-ACDN]; Peter D. Enrich, Saving the States from
Themselves: Commerce Clause Constraints on State Tax Incentives for Business, 110 HARV. L.
REV. 377, 383-85 (1996); cf. Andrew Hanson & Shawn Rohlin, Do Location-Based Tax
Incentives Attract New Business Establishments?, 51 J. REG’L SCI. 427, 428 (2011) (analyzing
the effect of tax credits on growth in business establishments in particular areas).
136. See I.R.C. § 103(a) (exempting state and municipal bonds from gross income).
137. This essentially parallels companies’ price discrimination efforts and consumers’
responses. See infra Part III.A.
138. A sense that taxes are fair and that everyone pays taxes has been found to contribute
to tax compliance. See, e.g., Marjorie E. Kornhauser, Normative and Cognitive Aspects of Tax
Compliance: Literature Review and Recommendations for the IRS Regarding Individual
Taxpayers, in 2 NATIONAL TAXPAYERADVOCATE:2007ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS 138, 149-
50 (2007); Leandra Lederman, Does Enforcement Reduce Voluntary Tax Compliance?, 2018
BYU L. REV. 623, 653-54 (collecting sources about tax compliance); Yair Listokin & David M.
Schizer, I Like to Pay Taxes: Taxpayer Support for Government Spending and the Efficiency
of the Tax System, 66 TAX L. REV. 179, 185 (2013). To the extent that a personalized tax
system undermines those perceptions, it could reduce tax compliance and thus revenue.
139. See, e.g., VARIAN, supra note 128, at 726-29.
140. See id. at 729.
141. See supra text accompanying notes 128-33. For example, suppose Jane’s reservation
price for piano lessons is twenty dollars. In an effort to persuade the government that she is
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Meanwhile, the government collects no tax revenue. Therefore,
Jane, her would-be student, and the government are all harmed by
Jane’s false signaling behavior.142 Similarly, recall our Medical
Machine example, in which personalized law induced people—more
specifically, people with joint pain who do not enjoy hiking—to drag
themselves up mountains in an attempt to get higher-quality hip
replacements.143 These activities are clearly wasteful, even if they
do not affect how the Medical Machine distributes joint replace-
ments.144 Further, these induced exertions could potentially
accelerate patients’ joint deterioration, resulting in more numerous
and more expensive surgeries over time.145
1. Counterargument: High Individual Cost of False Signaling
One response to this line of argument is to observe that personal-
ized law may take into account a large amount of data. This raises
the cost of misrepresenting oneself, especially over a long period of
time.146
Two points about this counterargument merit emphasis. First, a
high cost of sending false signals is a double-edged sword: high costs
may deter some individuals from changing their behavior, but they
will not deter everyone, and those individuals who are not deterred
strongly tax-sensitive, she turns down a fifty dollar lesson (which would let her keep thirty
dollars after paying 40 percent taxes). Jane has given up ten dollars in surplus now in her
attempts to secure more surplus later (at the government’s expense). Her would-be student
loses surplus as well because he does not get a lesson he was willing to pay for.
142. Jane’s other false signaling behaviors have similar implications. For example, if Jane
shifts her investments from corporate bonds to municipal bonds, the federal government will
collect less tax from her. See, e.g., JOSEPH BANKMAN, DANIEL N. SHAVIRO, KIRK J. STARK &
EDWARD D. KLEINBARD, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION 368 (18th ed. 2019). Unless Jane is in a
high tax bracket, investing in municipal bonds will likely provide her with lower net returns,
given the “implicit tax” imposed on such investments. See, e.g., id. at 368-70.
143. See supra text accompanying notes 111-12.
144. See, e.g., Michael Spence, Job Market Signaling, 87 Q.J. ECONOMICS 355, 368 (1973)
(noting the costs associated with signaling); VARIAN, supra note 128, at 727-29 (discussing
the inefficiency of education signaling in the job market).
145. See, e.g., Osteoarthritis, ARTHRITIS FOUND., https://www.arthritis.org/diseases/osteo
arthritis [https://perma.cc/6CQQ-LHJ2].
146. Cf. Porat & Strahilevitz, supra note 3, at 1455 (“[M]aintaining a charade may be easy
for a short period of time, [but] it gets harder ... (and easier ... to detect) with every passing
day.”).
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will incur large costs.147 These costs are intrinsic to a personalized
law system.148
Second, regulated individuals may not be the only ones who want
to manipulate personalized law. Data providers, gatekeepers, and
other interested parties may have strong incentives to alter data or
disguise individuals’ statuses. These actors may have the ability to
affect a large number of data points. Thus, their cost of intervention
may be relatively low, and countering the effects of their manipula-
tions (that is, weeding out all that bad data) may be quite difficult.
We have already discussed how patients in our Medical Machine
example might attempt to disguise themselves to change their
medical treatment. Patients are not the only ones who may wish to
deceive the Medical Machine; doctors may have a range of reasons
to game the system as well. For example, a doctor might conclude
that all patients deserve the higher-quality Acme brand joints. She
may then manipulate data—choosing tests that will color the
Medical Machine’s assessment of her patients,149 using testing
equipment that is improperly calibrated,150 organizing hikes for all
of her patients—to convince the Medical Machine that it is cost-
effective to give everyone Acme joints. She could also record
outcomes for patients who receive Acme joints as more positive than
they actually were, while doing the reverse for patients who receive
Beta joints. A doctor could also have the opposite conviction—that
Acme joints are overpriced and overrated and that patients get too
much free care on the taxpayer dollar—or any number of other
147. See, e.g., id. (“[E]mploying smoke screens is costly. If people regularly purchase
products they do not need, become Facebook friends with people they do not like, or develop
hobbies they do not enjoy in order to enhance the quality of their personalized ... [legal
outcome], they [are bearing real costs.] Changing one’s behavior is a costly signal; it is not
cheap talk.”).
148. On the one hand, it is good that false signaling behaviors are costly. False signaling
is socially undesirable behavior that is both inefficient and inequitable; we should want such
behavior to be costly in order to discourage people from engaging in it. However, the costs
created by these behaviors are real. In an ideal world, people would not engage in these
behaviors at all.
149. For example, a doctor could screen horror films (or Bob Ross) to patients while testing
their blood pressure in order to raise (or lower) the observed results.
150. For example, if a doctor has one thermometer that works correctly and a second that
regularly overestimates (or underestimates) temperatures by two degrees, she can make
patients appear healthier or sicker depending on which thermometer she uses.
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preferences that differ from those of the Medical Machine’s creators,
and manipulate the data to achieve her preferred result.151
Nor are patients and doctors the only actors who might wish to
deceive or manipulate the Medical Machine. Hospitals, insurers,
manufacturers of medical equipment, and even politicians may wish
to influence care decisions, and they all have levers they can pull to
further their ends.152
To be clear, all of these problems can arise in various forms under
depersonalized legal systems as well. In many cases, personalized
law may make these problems better;153 in some cases, it may make
them worse. But either way, these problems will persist.
151. For example, one could imagine a doctor motivated by more venal concerns seeking
to maximize the profit that the hospital receives from treatments, or even the amount of
compensation that the doctor receives from Acme or Beta. Cf. Dhruv Khullar & Anupam B.
Jena, Do Incentives Nudge Physicians to Prescribe Opioids for Pain?, STAT NEWS (Aug. 18,
2016), https://www.statnews.com/2016/08/18/opioids-pain-prescribing-physicians/ [https://
perma.cc/Z9BP-T95Q]; Charles Ornstein, Ryann Grochowski Jones & Mike Tigas, Drug-
Company Payments Mirror Doctors’ Brand-Name Prescribing, NPR (Mar. 17, 2016, 5:00 AM),
https://www.npr.org/sections/health-shots/2016/03/17/470679452/drug-company-payments-
mirror-doctors-brand-name-prescribing [https://perma.cc/2BJM-B9MX]; Aaron Kessler,
Elizabeth Cohen & Katherine Grise, The More Opioids Doctors Prescribe, the More Money
They Make, CNN (Mar. 12, 2018, 8:45 AM), https://www.cnn.com/2018/03/11/health/prescrip
tion-opioid-payments-eprise/index.html [https://perma.cc/MK6Z-FM2Q]. Doctors might also
have a variety of other socially problematic preferences, such as animus toward, or sub-
conscious biases against, a particular group of people. See, e.g., Andrea M. Elliott, Stewart C.
Alexander, Craig A. Mescher, Deepika Mohan & Amber E. Barnato, Differences in Physicians'
Verbal and Nonverbal Communication with Black and White Patients at the End of Life, 51
J. PAIN & SYMPTOM MGMT. 1, 4 (2016); Monique Tello, Racism and Discrimination in Health
Care: Providers and Patients, HARV. HEALTH BLOG (July 9, 2020, 12:34 PM), https://
www.health.harvard.edu/blog/racism-discrimination-health-care-providers-patients-2017
011611015 [https://perma.cc/T8D3-DHN8]; Michael O. Schroeder, Racial Bias in Medicine
Leads to Worse Care for Minorities, U.S. NEWS (Feb. 11, 2016, 10:13 AM), https://health.us
news.com/health-news/patient-advice/articles/2016-02-11/racial-bias-in-medicine-leads-to-
worse-care-for-minorities [https://perma.cc/W43L-TK5V].
152. Disability fraud cases provide a useful, if stark, example. To date, the biggest
prosecutions involved misconduct by gatekeepers and service providers. See, e.g., Top 5 Most
Outrageous Social Security Fraud Cases, RITACCO DISABILITY L. (June 8, 2017), [https://
perma.cc/6DVN-2HC8]; Timothy Williams, 70 Are Indicted in Puerto Rico in Social Security
Fraud, N.Y.TIMES (Aug. 21, 2013), https://www.nytimes.com/2013/08/22/us/70-are-indicated-
in-puerto-rico-in-social-security-fraud.html [https://perma.cc/C87Y-CJ8T].
153. Cf. Casey & Niblett, supra note 25, at 357-58 (tying personalized law’s benefits to how
lawmakers define “better” legal outcomes).
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2. Counterargument: Impenetrability of Personalized Law
One might also argue that people will not engage in false
signaling because they will not know which false signals to send to
achieve their goals. Under this argument, the “black box” nature of
personalized law renders its inner workings impenetrable, thereby
rendering gamesmanship impossible.154 For example, suppose that
personalized law relies on complicated machine learning algorithms.
People may not know how these algorithms work, and thus will not
know how to manipulate them.155 Because sending false signals is
costly, and because people cannot predict how sending a false signal
will affect their legal treatment,156 they may give up the attempt
altogether.
As a preliminary matter, personalized law’s algorithms may or
may not be impenetrable in practice. Assuming arguendo that
society intends the algorithms to be opaque,157 one can imagine an
arms race between regulators striving to hide how their algorithms
work and private parties working to crack the algorithms and take
advantage of their flaws. It is not obvious that regulators would
have the upper hand in such a battle.158 Regardless of who wins, the
arms race itself is socially wasteful, as regulators and regulated
parties spend valuable resources trying to outmaneuver each other.
We see similar dynamics playing out currently with respect to
privately maintained algorithms. Website owners use search engine
154. See, e.g., Porat & Strahilevitz, supra note 3, at 1455 (“[A] great deal of predictive




157. Cf. infra Part III.D.
158. For instance, regulators may have difficulties hiding the workings of their algorithm
given formal and informal pressures favoring government transparency. Regulated parties
presumably would have access to the personalized law—for example, doctors would have
access to the Medical Machine, and could ask it questions—so they may also be able to
reverse-engineer the algorithm, or at least hunt for misclassifications, simply by asking the
regulators to classify large numbers of (hypothetical) inputs. See infra Part III.D; cf. Casey
& Niblett, supra note 1, at 1419-20 (contemplating a world in which tax authorities would
allow taxpayers to enter facts into a website or app and get an immediate ruling on the
applicable tax consequences). Moreover, private firms may be willing to commit more
resources to the project of gaming regulations than governments will expend on enforcing
them, allowing the avoiders to devote more human and computational power to the
competition.
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optimization (SEO) to lift their sites toward the top of Google’s
search results for particular terms.159 Sellers boost their products
toward the top of Amazon’s search results.160 Companies and other
organizations game Facebook’s algorithms to disseminate particular
messages as widely as possible.161 These efforts cost tens of billions
of dollars each year.162
Google, Amazon, Facebook, and their ilk do not passively accept
such conduct. They are all large companies whose business models
depend on the quality and accuracy of their algorithms, and they
deploy their considerable technical expertise against those who
would manipulate them.163 Even so, they have a mixed record
against these machinations;164 in one infamous example, a backyard
159. See TJ McCue, SEO Industry Approaching $80 Billion but All You Want Is More Web
Traffic, FORBES (July 30, 2018, 3:41 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/tjmccue/2018/07/30/
seo-industry-approaching-80-billion-but-all-you-want-is-more-web-traffic/#54136d9c7337
[https://perma.cc/HZ5V-G9BV].
160. See, e.g., Jon Emont & Clément Bürge, How Scammers in China Manipulate Amazon,
WALL ST. J. (Dec. 17, 2018, 6:00 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/how-scammers-in-china-
manipulate-amazon-11545044402 [https://perma.cc/7NGP-Y6W3]; Leticia Miranda, Some
Amazon Sellers Are Paying $10,000 a Month to Trick Their Way to the Top, BUZZFEED NEWS
(Apr. 24, 2019, 4:47 PM), https://www.buzzfeednews.com/article/leticiamiranda/amazon-
marketplace-sellers-black-hat-scams-search-rankings [https://perma.cc/RJ2H-7B6J]; Laura
Stevens & Jon Emont, How Sellers Trick Amazon to Boost Sales, WALL ST. J. (July 28, 2018,
8:18 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/how-sellers-trick-amazon-to-boost-sales-1532750493
[https://perma.cc/7ZEU-YYHN].
161. See, e.g., Hunt Allcott & Matthew Gentzkow, Social Media and Fake News in the 2016
Election, 31 J. ECON. PERSPS. 211, 212-13, 226 (2017) (finding that, in the run-up to the 2016
election, social media was the “most important” news source for 14 percent of Americans, that
115 pro-Trump fake stories “were shared on Facebook a total of 30 million times, and 41 pro-
Clinton fake stories [were] shared a total of 7.6 million times,” and that the average American
adult “saw 1.14 fake stories”); Jessica Guynn & Elizabeth Weise, Thousands of Facebook Ads
Bought by Russians to Fool U.S. Voters Released by Congress, USATODAY (May 10, 2018, 7:19
PM), https://www.usatoday.com/story/tech/2018/05/10/thousands-russian-bought-facebook-
social-media-ads-released-congress/849959001/ [https://perma.cc/Y9EP-4K7G]; see also Sam-
uel C. Woolley & Douglas R. Guilbeault, Computational Propaganda in the United States of
America: Manufacturing Consensus Online 9-10 (Computational Propaganda Rsch. Project,
Working Paper No. 2017.5), http://comprop.oii.ox.ac.uk/wp-content/uploads/sites/89/2017/06/
Comprop-USA.pdf [https://perma.cc/B2FF-82GH].
162. See, e.g., McCue, supra note 159.
163. See, e.g., Stevens & Emont, supra note 160.
164. See, e.g., Rob Copeland & Katherine Bindley, Millions of Business Listings on Google
Maps Are Fake—and Google Profits, WALL ST. J. (June 20, 2019, 7:44 PM), https://www.
wsj.com/articles/google-maps-littered-with-fake-business-listings-harming-consumers-and-
competitors-11561042283 [https://perma.cc/TQ8M-GZWR]; Oobah Butler, I Made My Shed
the Top-Rated Restaurant on TripAdvisor, VICE (Dec. 6, 2017, 12:20 PM), https://www.vice.
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shed that had never served a customer got itself ranked as
TripAdvisor’s number one restaurant in London.165 It is not clear
that government regulators would do better at combatting games-
manship than these companies have.166
Even assuming that regulators’ algorithms are impenetrable, that
still will not eliminate the problem of false signaling; regulated
parties’ lack of information may deter some strategic behavior but
can also spawn additional wasteful conduct.167 People will have
strong incentives to change the legal rules that apply to them.168
Even if an individual only has weak guesses about how an algo-
rithm works, acting on those guesses will still be worthwhile if the
gains from changing her classification are large enough; a low
probability of a high payoff can induce action.169
Impenetrable algorithms can produce even larger costs when
regulated parties misunderstand them. Many people currently
hold—and act on—incorrect beliefs about the law.170 For example,
many people believe that undercover police officers must identify
themselves as police when asked; this is not the case.171 Perhaps
com/en_us/article/434gqw/i-made-my-shed-the-top-rated-restaurant-on-tripadvisor [https://
perma.cc/DG2U-SAZS] (describing the author’s experience at a previous job where res-
taurants he had never visited would pay him thirteen dollars to write a positive review on
TripAdvisor and his observation from “monitoring the ratings of these businesses ... [that
their] fortunes would genuinely turn”).
165. Butler, supra note 164.
166. Private companies, driven by profit motive, may have better incentives to address
these problems than the government does. Because private companies often pay more than
government does, they seem likely to attract more top-flight computer programmers. On the
other hand, government does have greater coercive powers at its disposal to deploy against
misbehavior.
167. See, e.g., Porat & Strahilevitz, supra note 3, at 1454-55.
168. See, e.g., id. at 1455.
169. See generally Manfred Borovcnik, Risk and Decision Making: The “Logic” of
Probability, 12 MATHEMATICS ENTHUSIAST 113 (2015) (defining risk and analyzing its
interaction with probability and utility). This point is readily apparent in many everyday
behaviors, such as buying a lottery ticket, insuring one’s home or car, or wearing a seatbelt.
170. See, e.g., Andrew Lu, Do You Have a ‘Right’ to Phone Calls After Arrest?, FINDLAW
(May 1, 2013, 10:08 AM), http://blogs.findlaw.com/blotter/2013/05/do-you-have-a-right-to-
phone-calls-after-arrest.html [https://perma.cc/8TB4-KHPY] (describing the common miscon-
ception that individuals are entitled to one phone call after arrest); Karl Smallwood, Are You
Really Entitled to a Phone Call When Arrested?, TODAYIFOUNDOUT (May 9, 2014),
http://www.todayifoundout.com/index.php/2014/05/really-entitled-phonecall-arrested/
[https://perma.cc/BT9U-FNM8] (explaining that the number of phone calls an individual may
make varies depending on a range of factors).
171. See, e.g., Common Myths About Police Encounters, ACLU OF NEV., https://www.aclunv.
756 WILLIAM & MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 62:723
more disturbingly, large swaths of the public hold mistaken beliefs
about major facets of contract law172—a body of law with which most
people interact daily and which many commentators defend as
intuitive and in line with people’s expectations. An opaque algo-
rithm seems likely to spawn more confusion and misconceptions
than publicly posted laws do. People acting on false beliefs will incur
real costs.173
A related problem is that if people do not understand how the
personalized law program works, they may not trust it to do its job.
Thus, they may feel the need to engage in costly signaling to ensure
that the system characterizes them correctly. This signaling can
result in regulated parties incurring costs, even when they are not
necessary.174
For example, assume Alex is an avid rock climber who will reap
substantial benefits from an Acme joint. Further, assume that the
Medical Machine can deduce these facts about Alex and will assign
her an Acme joint, but that Alex does not know this.175 Alex may
decide that she should buy a Fitbit, join Crossfit, and register for a
marathon to ensure that the Medical Machine knows she is the type
of person who should receive an Acme joint. In fact, these costly
expenditures of time and effort are totally unnecessary, as the
Medical Machine was already going to assign Alex an Acme joint.176
Perhaps more troublingly, this problem can also manifest itself at
the provider level. Suppose a doctor comes to believe—rightly or
org/sites/default/files/sex_workers_myths_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/DT97-SECN].
172. See, e.g., Meirav Furth-Matzkin & Roseanna Sommers, Consumer Psychology and the
Problem of Fine-Print Fraud, 72 STAN. L. REV. 503, 541-42 (2020) (finding that consumers
believe that fine print is enforceable even when a contract is secured through
misrepresentation); Matthew A. Seligman, The Error Theory of Contract, 78 MD. L. REV. 147,
169 (2018) (finding that 31 percent of survey respondents believe specific performance is the
typical remedy for breach of contract); Roseanna Sommers, Commonsense Consent, 129 YALE
L.J. 2232, 2236 (2020) (reporting that laypeople often believe that contracts obtained via
deception are legally enforceable even when they are not); Tess Wilkinson-Ryan & David A.
Hoffman, The Common Sense of Contract Formation, 67 STAN. L. REV. 1269, 1297 (2015)
(finding that people believe that formalities are key to contract formation, rather than assent).
173. See, e.g., Porat & Strahilevitz, supra note 3, at 1455 (describing the costs of fake
signaling).
174. Cf. id. (arguing that false signaling by consumers will often harm them).
175. Cf. DREW FUDENBERG & JEAN TIROLE, GAME THEORY 541-71 (1991) (discussing the
effects of knowledge on equilibrium behavior).
176. Moreover, these activities may have damaged her knee further, increasing the cost
and frequency of her surgery. See supra note 148 and accompanying text.
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not—that her colleagues report overly rosy assessments of patients’
health after they receive Acme joints. She might then feel obligated
to report similarly rosy assessments of her own patients to make
sure that the Medical Machine classifies her patients correctly and
gives them appropriate joints. If she begins coloring her reporting,
that further increases the pressure on other doctors to do the same.
As more doctors change their reporting practices, the data becomes
less accurate, reducing the Medical Machine’s ability to match
outcomes to circumstances as originally contemplated. Once doctors
report inaccurately—or are perceived to—it becomes very difficult
for any individual doctor to push back against the practice, lest her
patients be given worse joints.177
In summary, it is questionable whether personalized law would
truly be an impenetrable black box. Even if it were, that would not
eliminate costly gamesmanship. Thus, the opacity of personalized
law offers at most a partial counterargument against the signaling
problems identified above.
C. Moral Hazard
Rational actors consider the future consequences of their actions
when they make decisions. Altering the possible outcomes that an
individual faces in the future can cause her to change her present
conduct for the worse.178 For example, if Dana is uninsured, she
bears the full cost of having her car stolen and will have good
incentives to protect her car against theft.179 On the other hand, if
insurance will fully compensate Dana if her car is stolen, she has
little incentive to keep her car secure.180
177. The doctor might also be subject to direct negative consequences. For example, the
government might see that her patients have worse outcomes than other doctors’ patients do
and decide that Medicare will not pay for any joint replacements that she performs.
178. Such alterations can also induce people to change their conduct for the better, and
many laws are written with this intent in mind. See generally Uri Gneezy, Stephan Meier &
Pedro Rey-Biel, When and Why Incentives (Don’t) Work to Modify Behavior, 25 J. ECON.
PERSPS. 191 (2011) (analyzing when incentives can generate positive behavior). For example,
the tax law accords a deduction for those who donate to charity as a way of encouraging
charitable donations. See 26 I.R.C. § 170(a)(1).
179. See VARIAN, supra note 128, at 724.
180. See, e.g., id. An overinsured person may intentionally court disaster. See, e.g., “Nub
City”—the Florida Town Where People Cut Off Their Appendages for Insurance Money, VA
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Economists refer to this phenomenon as moral hazard.181 Moral
hazard differs from signaling because signaling is about actions that
convey (or disguise) characteristics without changing them, whereas
moral hazard entails actually changing the characteristics them-
selves.182 Like signaling, moral hazard is an old and well-known
problem183 that personalized law can exacerbate. In particular, when
personalized regulation affords better treatment to those who find
themselves in worse positions, people will have fewer incentives to
avoid being in bad positions.184
For example, returning to the Medical Machine, suppose that Pat
has recurring hip pain, but that her condition is not deemed severe
enough to merit immediate replacement; Pat is placed down the
queue. If Pat would prefer to get her hip replaced now, she would
have incentives to exacerbate her condition in order to qualify for a
new joint more quickly; she might book a ski trip or a day at the
trampoline park.
Similar self-destructive and socially undesirable behaviors can
arise in many other contexts. For instance, imagine a personalized
environmental law regime that considers how costly it is for each
factory to reduce its emissions; factories with a high cost of reducing
pollution (“hard-to-green” factories) are allowed to emit more
pollution than those that can reduce pollution more cheaply. This
approach may work well if the factories are already built.185 But, if
companies know that hard-to-green factories will receive better
regulatory treatment, they will have incentives to build hard-to-
green factories.186 This can produce much worse results than a
VIPER (Mar. 15, 2018), http://vaviper.blogspot.com/2018/03/nub-city-florida-town-where-peo
ple-cut.html [https://perma.cc/AT89-22K7].
181. VARIAN, supra note 128, at 724.
182. See id. at 724-26.
183. See id. at 724.
184. See Omri Ben-Shahar & Ariel Porat, Personalizing Mandatory Rules in Contract Law,
86 U. CHI. L. REV. 255, 270 (2019).
185. In this case, the legal rule will not affect the design of the factories. Thus, the only
efficiency concern is how to reduce pollution at the least cost, given the factories that already
exist.
186. For example, suppose that there are two factory designs. Each emits the same amount
of pollution, each can be modified to produce a lesser amount of pollution, and reducing a
factory’s pollution level creates $500,000 in social benefits. The “easy-to-green” factory costs
$1 million to build and can be modified to reduce pollution at a cost of $300,000. The hard-to-
green factory costs $1.1 million, and its pollution can be reduced at a cost of $900,000. Assume
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depersonalized system that requires all companies to reduce
pollution by a fixed amount or a fixed percentage, or that taxes
factories on each ton of pollution they emit.187 Companies would
have similar incentives with respect to many other personalized
legal regimes, including worker safety, animal testing laws,
computer security, and privacy protections.
To provide another example, assume a personalized system of
traffic laws, administered via self-driving cars.188 People who
urgently need to be somewhere at a particular time get priority
treatment and are shuttled through traffic to arrive promptly at
their destinations, while others who are less time-sensitive face
delays. Dr. Garcia, who is set to perform surgery in a short time,
would be shunted rapidly to the hospital.189 However, if she were to
leave her house earlier, there would be comparatively little rush to
get her to work; therefore, the traffic system would give her a lower
priority and a longer ride. Knowing this, and preferring to spend
time at home rather than in traffic, Dr. Garcia would have incen-
tives to leave for work later, even though this imposes costs on other
commuters and raises the chance that she will be late for her
surgery.
In a depersonalized system in which all cars must navigate the
same traffic, Dr. Garcia has better incentives to leave early to beat
the traffic and ensure that she is on time for her surgery. Thus,
the law requires easy-to-green factories to reduce their pollution output, as the social benefits
of doing so exceed the costs. Suppose further that hard-to-green factories need not reduce
their pollution, as the costs exceed the social benefits. If companies anticipate the legal rule,
they will find hard-to-green factories more profitable (total cost $1.1 million) than easy-to-
green factories (total cost $1.3 million). The incentive stems entirely from the difference in
legal treatment.
187. For instance, continuing the example above, if all factories must reduce pollution,
easy-to-green factories (total cost $1.3 million) are more profitable than hard-to-green ones
(total cost $2 million). Easy-to-green factories are similarly more profitable if there is a fixed
tax on pollutants emitted.
188. One could also achieve the same result via a sufficiently sophisticated congestion
pricing system.
189. Cf. Casey & Niblett, supra note 1, at 1417 (“[T]raffic lights in some jurisdictions
already contain sensors ... and adjust the timing of red and green lights accordingly. Some
traffic lights contain detectors allowing emergency service vehicles to ‘preempt’ the signal and
expedite their journey.... In the not-so-distant future, a traffic-light system may know that a
passenger in a regular vehicle requires medical attention and give the rushing driver a series
of green lights all the way to the hospital.” (footnotes omitted)).
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moral hazard can lead personalized law to produce worse outcomes
than a depersonalized system.
III. REGULATORY RESPONSES AND THEIR LIMITS
We now shift our focus of analysis from the regulated parties to
the regulators themselves. When designing personalized legal
systems, regulators must take into account how people will respond
to the system they are creating.190 A regulatory regime that properly
accounts for these machinations—one that does not afford regulated
parties attractive opportunities to manipulate it in ways that
regulators do not want—is termed “incentive compatible.”191
However, incentive compatibility is a high standard.192 It is
unlikely that a personalized legal regime can both impose the
optimal rule in all situations and be incentive compatible.193
If regulators impose personalized laws that match optimal
outcomes to all situations but that are not incentive compatible,
regulated parties will thwart the system. As a result, personalized
law will not work as regulators intended and will not optimally
match situations to outcomes. Alternatively, regulators can
prioritize creating an incentive-compatible system at the cost of a
poorer matching of circumstances to legal outcomes.194 Such a
system is likely to operate as regulators intended but will not
produce the optimal result in all cases. Whichever option regulators
choose, personalized law will not create optimal results in all
circumstances.
190. Victor Fleischer, Regulatory Arbitrage, 89 TEX.L.REV. 227, 253, 288 (2010); see Barry,
supra note 52, at 73 (“[R]egulatory arbitrage can be eliminated by crafting legal rules that ...
take economic reality into account.”).
191. See MAS-COLELL ET AL., supra note 26, at 493-94.
192. See Jerry Green & Jean-Jacques Laffont, Characterization of Satisfactory Mechanisms
for the Revelation of Preferences for Public Goods, 45 ECONOMETRICA 427, 427 (1977).
193. For possible counterexamples, see Porat & Strahilevitz, supra note 3, at 1475, for an
argument that personalized disclosure rules will provide individuals with little incentive to
engage in strategic behavior to change the disclosures they receive, and Seligman, supra note
134, at 3, for the proposal that individuals have a choice between certain private law regimes.
194. See Fleischer, supra note 190, at 289 (stating that “enhancing legal antiavoidance
constraints, while imperfect, is likely to be a more fruitful line of attack for policy makers” to
the attractiveness of opportunities to manipulate the system).
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We now turn to the technological, social, and political reasons
why it is so difficult to craft an incentive-compatible legal regime.
In particular, regulators will encounter problems of information,
authority, and transparency. These issues interrelate and feed off
each other and are likely to foster conservatism on the part of reg-
ulators, which will itself be a constraint.195
A. Information Problems 1: Muddling
Consider the criteria that a personalized law regime must satisfy
to be incentive compatible: No regulated party can have any
incentive to falsely identify itself when asked.196 No regulated party
can have any incentive to engage in false signaling.197 No regulated
party can be tempted by moral hazard.198 An optimal Medical
Machine must allocate medical resources—and must render
ineffectual the false-signaling efforts of patients looking to improve
their medical treatment. An optimal system of personalized
environmental regulation must allocate pollution rights across
existing factories and defeat the moral hazard problems described
above, which encourage companies to build hard-to-green factories.
One way to eliminate parties’ incentive to engage in problematic
behaviors is to detect such behaviors and punish them.199 If the
environmental agency has a crack team of inspectors who can
always determine whether a company built a hard-to-green factory
to achieve better regulatory treatment, the agency can treat the
factory as if it were not a hard-to-green factory.200 Such measures
will eliminate companies’ regulatory incentives to build hard-to-
green factories and thus the moral hazard problem.201
195. See infra Part III.E.
196. See Green & Laffont, supra note 192, at 431.
197. See id.
198. See id. at 430.
199. See VARIAN, supra note 128, at 726.
200. For instance, returning to the facts of note 186, if a company would have built an easy-
to-green factory if not for the hard-to-green factory’s regulatory advantages, the regulator can
require the company to reduce the pollution of its factory. This makes the total cost of the
hard-to-green factory $2 million and the total cost of an easy-to-green factory $1.3 million,
eliminating the regulatory incentive to construct hard-to-green factories.
201. Continuing the example above, if the company knows that moral hazard behavior will
be detected and will create no regulatory benefits, it will prefer to build an easy-to-green
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However, this type of detection is generally costly, difficult, and
imperfect.202 The environmental agency may not have enough
information to unravel the process of how the factory’s design
evolved. This information problem may be even more severe in other
contexts. How are regulators to tell whether Bob drank champagne
to aggravate his liver problems, or why Dr. Garcia is running late
for work?203
Regulated parties will purposefully exacerbate regulators’ infor-
mation problems. If a company building a factory anticipates an
investigation into its intentions during construction, it will attempt
to make its intentions appear as positive as possible.204 The basic
dynamic—regulated individuals will change their behavior to im-
prove their legal treatment—continues to apply. Data muddling by
regulated parties will complicate big data analytics, limiting reg-
ulators’ ability to optimally match circumstances to outcomes.
We have already seen this dynamic play out in the private
sphere.205 Companies’ most successful big data efforts seem to have
been those that consumers had no desire to thwart. Consider
retailer Target, which has received accolades for its use of big data
to identify and target shoppers.206 Target identified pregnancy as a
time when shoppers tend to forge long-lived purchasing patterns.
Accordingly, it was particularly important to identify pregnant
factory (total cost $1.3 million) rather than a hard-to-green factory (total cost $2 million).
202. See VARIAN, supra note 128, at 654.
203. Regulators can offset gaps in detection with increases in punishment for those who
are caught. However, there are limitations on how far this strategy can go, and how much we
should expect it to be politically feasible. See infra Parts III.B-C.
204. To quote Matt Levine:
[The] First Law of Bribes ... is that when you are talking about bribes,
particularly in writing, you should not refer to them as “bribes,” and you should
certainly not refer to them as “chickens” or “sugar” or some other clever eu-
phemism; you should refer to them by boring but technically accurate terms....
[U]sing boring business terms gives you a fighting chance of not getting caught,
and even if you do get caught you’ve got a fighting chance to persuade a jury that
it was all fine, and even if you do get convicted it is just, I mean, it is aes-
thetically a bit less embarrassing than if you’d used the dumb euphemisms.
Matt Levine, The Dogs Ate SoftBank’s Money, BLOOMBERG (Dec. 10, 2019, 11:59 AM), https://
www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2019-12-10/the-dogs-ate-softbank-s-money [https://
perma.cc/3YQ3-9ADD].
205. See, e.g., supra notes 159-62 and accompanying text.
206. See generally Duhigg, supra note 15 (describing Target's successful big data collection
efforts).
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shoppers and get them to purchase items from Target.207 Some
pregnant shoppers self-identified by opening baby registries with
Target.208 To spot other pregnant shoppers, Target used big data
techniques to find shoppers who had not opened a baby registry
with Target but whose behavior changed in the same ways that
Target’s baby-registering shoppers’ behavior did.209 Presumably,
some of these changes were straightforward—purchasing maternity
clothes, breastfeeding paraphernalia, baby items—but others were
more subtle. For instance, one key indicator was that pregnant
shoppers tended to switch from scented to unscented lotions,
perhaps because their sense of smell sharpened and they experi-
enced increased nausea.210
Target’s shopper identification is impressive and has proven
profitable for the retailer.211 However, it bears emphasis that Target
shoppers were not actively trying to game their pregnancy status.212
It does not appear that pregnant women were trying to falsely
signal to Target that they were not pregnant,213 and it is hard to
imagine anyone seeking to become pregnant in order to open a
Target baby registry.214
Regulated parties, by contrast, often care quite a bit about their
legal treatment and may want to hide or disguise some of their
characteristics from regulators. Thus, companies’ experiences with
personalized advertising and product offerings will not fully
translate to the regulatory context. For a closer private sector
analog, consider companies’ efforts to price discriminate: If a
company can tell how much consumers are willing to pay for
207. Id.
208. Id.
209. Id.; see also Kashmir Hill, How Target Figured Out a Teen Girl Was Pregnant Before
Her Father Did, FORBES (Feb. 16, 2012, 11:02 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/kashmirhill/
2012/02/16/how-target-figured-out-a-teen-girl-was-pregnant-before-her-father-did/?sh=2fcfe
2066686 [https://perma.cc/SBW9-XX57] (“Target, for example, has figured out how to data-
mine its way into your womb, to figure out whether you have a baby on the way long before
you need to start buying diapers.”).




214. On the other hand, if pregnant women received valuable discounts, nonpregnant
women would have an incentive to falsely signal that they were pregnant. This may have
happened; or customers may not have known about the opportunity.
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products, it can profit by charging higher prices to less price-
sensitive customers and lower prices to more price-sensitive
customers.215 In this instance, consumers all wish to be perceived as
strongly price-sensitive, even if they are not, in order to receive
better deals.216
Price discrimination is a potentially attractive strategy for
companies such as Uber or Amazon; both companies have large
amounts of information about their customers, have sophisticated
data analytics professionals, and employ interfaces that allow them
to offer different prices to different customers simultaneously.217 For
example, Uber could charge higher prices to customers who are
traveling on expense accounts,218 heading to luxury destinations,219
or whose phones are running out of power.220 Yet both Uber and
Amazon have encountered obstacles when they attempted to put
price discrimination strategies into practice.221
One major obstacle these companies encountered is that custom-
ers began injecting false data points into the system to manipulate
the companies’ predictive algorithms. Amazon shoppers intention-
ally browsed through items without buying them, suggesting to
Amazon’s algorithm that they were price-sensitive.222 Uber users
produced the same effect by requesting rides and then canceling
215. VARIAN, supra note 128, at 467-68.
216. Id. at 465.
217. See, e.g., Bar-Gill, supra note 13, at 225-26; Elizabeth Pollman & Jordan M. Barry,
Regulatory Entrepreneurship, 90 S. CAL. L. REV. 383, 387-88 (2017).
218. Separate Your Work and Personal Trips by Creating an Uber Business Profile, UBER
BLOG (Aug. 30, 2016), https://www.uber.com/en-AU/blog/business-profile/ [https://perma.cc/
SJF8-38PY]; Will Preston, Uber Is Ripping Off Frequent Riders and Here’s How to Avoid It,
RIDE SHARE GUY (Mar. 21, 2018), https://therideshareguy.com/uber-is-ripping-off-frequent-
riders-and-heres-how-to-avoid-it/ [https://perma.cc/VX37-64MK].
219. See Eric Newcomer, Uber Starts Charging What It Thinks You’re Willing to Pay,
BLOOMBERG (May 19, 2017, 3:19 PM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-05-
19/uber-s-future-may-rely-on-predicting-how-much-you-re-willing-to-pay [https://perma.cc/
EA94-6YTQ] (describing Uber’s experimenting with “route-based pricing”).
220. Amit Chowdhry, Uber: Users Are More Likely to Pay Surge Pricing If Their Phone
Battery Is Low, FORBES (May 25, 2016, 6:30 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/amitchowdhry/
2016/05/25/uber-low-battery/#4da9c46974b3 [https://perma.cc/QAW5-R3B9].
221. Newcomer, supra note 219; Jennifer Abel, Lawsuit Alleges Amazon Charges Prime
Members for “Free” Shipping, CONSUMER AFFS. (Mar. 14, 2014), https://www.consumeraffairs.
com/news/lawsuit-alleges-amazon-charges-prime-members-for-free-shipping-031414.html
[https://perma.cc/9BYD-FUBA].
222. Abel, supra note 221.
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when they saw those rides’ prices.223 Uber users have also thwarted
Uber’s algorithms by changing their destination mid-ride.224
Since its initial foray into price discrimination, Uber has denied
that it offers different prices to individual riders.225 It has also begun
offering its own credit card.226 That card’s benefits program and
privacy policy suggest that one of Uber’s motivations for the venture
may be the data it will generate on each individual customer’s
spending.227 This data would be more difficult for consumers to
muddle, potentially enabling Uber to price discriminate better.228
Regulators implementing personalized laws can expect to face
similar challenges. However, as Section B explains, regulators may
not be able to follow Uber’s hypothesized approach.
B. Information Problems 2: Privacy
Regulators can overcome the problems described in Section A if
they have access to information that is both tightly tied to the
behaviors of interest and difficult for regulated parties to muddle.229
But even if such information is technologically available, privacy
concerns may lead society to limit regulators’ ability to access or use
it.230
223. See Kominers, supra note 18.
224. Aaron Mak, Is Uber Really Charging Frequent Users Higher Fares?, SLATE (Mar. 30,
2018, 2:40 PM), https://slate.com/technology/2018/03/is-uber-really-charging-frequent-users-
more.html [https://perma.cc/WN84-HYNW]; Preston, supra note 218.
225. See, e.g., Arwa Mahdawi, Is Your Friend Getting a Cheaper Uber Fare Than You Are?,
GUARDIAN (Apr. 13, 2018, 12:39 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2018/apr/
13/uber-lyft-prices-personalized-data [https://perma.cc/YV53-A5M5].
226. Scott Duke Kominers, Uber Really Wants You to Use Its Credit Card, BLOOMBERG
(Dec. 6, 2017, 5:00 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2017-12-06/uber-really-
wants-you-to-use-its-credit-card [https://perma.cc/V9QE-QCTJ].
227. Id. If so, Uber would not be the first big company to launch a line of business for the
purpose of gathering data. Cf. Porat & Strahilevitz, supra note 3, at 1439 (suggesting that
getting access to data on individuals’ preferences, and hence their personalities, motivated
Google to enter the smartphone business).
228. Kominers, supra note 226; see Porat & Strahilevitz, supra note 3, at 1437-38
(discussing how private firms often have greater confidence in big data based on consumers’
purchasing behavior because it is less likely to be manipulated by consumers).
229. See, e.g., Porat & Strahilevitz, supra note 3, at 1454 (“[P]ersonalized ... rules tied to
an individual's immutable characteristics, such as sex or age, alleviate significant concerns
about strategic behavior.”).
230. See, e.g., Alessandro Acquisti, The Economics and Behavioral Economics of Privacy,
in PRIVACY,BIGDATA, AND THE PUBLIC GOOD:FRAMEWORKS FOR ENGAGEMENT 76, 78-91 (Julia
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Personalized law raises fundamental questions about how
closely—some might say intrusively—we want human behavior to
be regulated.231 For many, the idea of a regulator that knows enough
to draw fine distinctions among its citizens evokes the image of a
dystopic police state.232 For some, the closest analogy may be
China’s “social credit system,” which assigns each Chinese citizen
a social credit score based on her behavior.233 A wide variety of
behaviors affect that score: “bad driving, smoking in non-smoking
zones, [or] buying too many video games” can all lower one’s score.234
Paying bills on time, buying Chinese products, and performing
community service can raise one’s score.235 Citizens with high social
credit scores get rewards such as reduced energy bills, better rental
terms, better interest rates on loans, and more matches on dating
websites.236 Those with low social credit scores can be subjected to
a variety of punishments, including not being permitted to purchase
airline or train tickets; lower internet speeds; exclusion from
schools, jobs, or hotels; public shaming; and having their pets
Lane et al. eds., 2014); Niva Elkin-Koren & Michal S. Gal, The Chilling Effect of Governance-
by-Data on Data Markets, 86 U. CHI. L. REV. 403, 403 (2019) (“The sharing of data for the
purpose of law enforcement raises obvious concerns for civil liberties.”); Paul Ohm, Broken
Promises of Privacy: Responding to the Surprising Failure of Anonymization, 57 UCLA L. REV.
1701, 1704, 1733 (2010); Daniel J. Solove, Data Mining and the Security-Liberty Debate, 75
U. CHI. L. REV. 343, 345 (2008); Omer Tene & Jules Polonetsky, Privacy in the Age of Big
Data: A Time for Big Decisions, 64 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 63, 63 (2012).
231. See, e.g., Shiffrin, supra note 51, at 1223, 1244 (arguing that standards require people
to engage in ethical decision-making that is important to moral health, and that too many
clear directives could erode moral health); Thomas A. Smith, From Law to Automation, 1
CRITERION J. ON INNOVATION 535, 536 (2016).
232. See Ma, supra note 62.
233. Id. The system has been piloted on millions of citizens to date and was scheduled to
become compulsory for all citizens in 2020. Id.; see, e.g., Sophie Perryer, China’s Social Credit
System Awards Points to Citizens Who Conform, NEW ECON. (May 22, 2019), https://www.
theneweconomy.com/strategy/116498 [https://perma.cc/NTU7-RQYC].
234. Ma, supra note 62; see Perryer, supra note 233.
235. How Can Chinese Citizens Increase Their ‘Social Credit Score’?, DAILY MAIL (Aug. 21,
2018, 12:50 PM), https://www.dailymail.co.uk/sciencetech/fb-6083597/HOW-CHINESE-CITI
ZENS-INCREASE-SOCIAL-CREDIT-SCORE.html [https://perma.cc/E62A-QRY4].
236. Ma, supra note 62; Simina Mistreanu, Life Inside China’s Social Credit Laboratory,
FOREIGN POL’Y (Apr. 3, 2018), https://foreignpolicy.com/2018/04/03/life-inside-chinas-social-
credit-laboratory/ [https://perma.cc/28D5-YB7Z].
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confiscated.237 Western commentators have generally taken an
unfavorable view of this system.238
In many instances, our society has tried to prevent overreach by
restricting access to personal information.239 Sometimes these
restrictions take the form of outright prohibitions on the use of
certain data by public or private actors. For example, Congress has
restricted the government’s use of emails, financial information, and
similar information that was gathered for foreign intelligence
purposes.240 The Equal Credit Opportunity Act prohibits lenders
from inquiring about a borrower’s public assistance status, marital
status, or birth control practices, among other topics.241
In other instances, the law requires public or private actors to
clear procedural hurdles before accessing particular data.242 The
Fourth Amendment famously requires law enforcement officers to
obtain a warrant prior to conducting searches or seizures.243 The
Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA) limits access to consumers’ credit
history: credit reporting agencies can only allow potential lenders
and others with a similar “valid need” to access a consumer’s file.244
237. Ma, supra note 62.
238. See, e.g., id. (calling it “creepy”); Maya Wang, China’s Chilling ‘Social Credit’ Blacklist,
WALL ST. J. (Dec. 11, 2017, 6:47 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/chinas-chilling-social-
credit-blacklist-1513036054 [https://perma.cc/G6BV-2W5W]; Rachel Botsman, Big Data Meets
Big Brother as China Moves to Rate Its Citizens, WIRED UK (Oct. 21, 2017), https://www.
wired.co.uk/article/chinese-government-social-credit-score-privacy-invasion [https://perma.cc/
C4M7-VRDE].
239. See Elkin-Koren & Gal, supra note 230, at 415-16 (noting that using data for regula-
tory purposes can change the incentives to collect data and thus can reduce the amount of
data available).
240. Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986, 18 U.S.C. § 2703 (restricting the
government’s access to electronic communications); Right to Financial Privacy Act of 1978,
12 U.S.C. § 3402 (limiting the government’s access to financial information); Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, 50 U.S.C. § 1801 (codifying minimization procedures the
government must follow to protect private parties’ information); USA FREEDOM Act of 2015
§§ 201-02, 50 U.S.C. §§ 1841(4)(B), 1842(h)(1) (providing privacy safeguards for information
gathered by pen registers, and trap and trace devices).
241. See 12 C.F.R. § 202.6 (2019); Your Equal Credit Opportunity Rights, FTC CONSUMER
INFO. (Jan. 2013), https://www.consumer.ftc.gov/articles/0347-your-equal-credit-opportunity-
rights [https://perma.cc/NV9Z-KGX3]. But see 12 C.F.R. § 202.5 (2019) (allowing creditors to
inquire into marital status in certain ways under specific circumstances).
242. See, e.g., I.R.C. §§ 6103, 7213 (noting procedural hurdles that must be cleared before
certain consumer tax information can be disclosed).
243. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
244. FTC, A SUMMARY OF YOUR RIGHTS UNDER THE FAIR CREDIT REPORTING ACT 2,
https://www.consumer.ftc.gov/articles/pdf-0096-fair-credit-reporting-act.pdf [https://perma.
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A consumer who is denied credit, insurance, or employment because
of her credit report must be informed and given the contact
information of the agency that provided the report.245 Furthermore,
FCRA requires credit reporting agencies to adhere to various
procedures while maintaining credit files.246 Among other require-
ments, credit reporting agencies must give consumers access to all
of the information in their files, provide consumers their credit score
upon request, investigate claims that information in the file is
inaccurate, and delete or correct inaccurate, incomplete, or unverifi-
able information.247
From the perspective of personalized lawmaking, the two
approaches described above—taking information off the table or
placing it behind procedural barriers—constitute differences in
degree, but not in kind. Both reduce the amount of data that
policymakers can bring to bear and the ways in which they can
deploy it.248 Accordingly, both limit regulators’ ability to personalize
law.249
Even if regulators are legally permitted to use certain data,
privacy concerns may still shape and limit the personalization of
law. First, regulators may need to take efforts to maintain the
security of certain information entrusted to their care.250 Such
security measures may make it more difficult to use that data. For
example, the gold standard for safeguarding data is to only keep it
on computers that are not connected to the internet, sometimes
cc/VT2L-BHVW]. FCRA uses the term “consumer reporting agency.” Id. at 1. For the benefit
of readers who are unfamiliar with FCRA’s statutory framework, we use the (hopefully more
intuitive) phrase “credit reporting agency.” See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681(a)(4), 1681(b).
245. FTC, supra note 244, at 1.
246. Id. at 1-2.
247. Id. Some of FCRA’s other requirements are that credit reporting agencies may not
report negative information that happened sufficiently far in the past, they may not give
access to an employer or potential employer without the consumer’s written consent, and they
must allow consumers to implement a “security freeze” that prohibits the release of any
information without the consumer’s express authorization. Id. at 2.
248. See Porat & Strahilevitz, supra note 3, at 1467-68 (noting the trade-offs between
protecting privacy and the degree of legal personalization).
249. Id. at 1467.
250. See, e.g., U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., SAFEGUARDING STUDENT PRIVACY 1, https://www2.
ed.gov/policy/gen/guid/fpco/ferpa/safeguarding-student-privacy.pdf [https://perma.cc/S9KE-
A64Y]; U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., SUMMARY OF THE HIPAA SECURITY RULE (July
26, 2013), https://www.hhs.gov/hipaa/for-professionals/security/laws-regulations/index.html
[https://perma.cc/CV7R-QF3C].
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known as “air-gapping.”251 Air-gapping makes data more secure by
making it much harder for would-be hackers to access it—but it also
makes it much harder for workers within an organization to access
that data.252 Less draconian security measures also create access
problems. For instance, Veterans Administration doctors have com-
plained that security measures designed to protect service members’
medical information make it difficult for doctors to access patient
records and to provide care.253
Second, an extremely well-tailored rule may tell regulated parties
that the regulator knows a great deal about them. Regulators may
not wish to make this fact so salient—for altruistic reasons, self-
serving reasons, or a combination of the two.
For example, avid runner Alex may be grateful when the Medical
Machine assigns her an Acme joint, but she may also be disturbed
that the government knew enough about her habits and lifestyle to
make that decision.254 A purely altruistic regulator should take into
account the discomfort that Alex experiences from her loss of pri-
vacy, as revealed to her through overly specific rules, when design-
ing personalized laws. A self-interested regulator should also
include Alex’s discomfort in its calculations, albeit for different
reasons: citizens’ unease may lead to political consequences that the
regulator does not want; that unease may cause Alex (and others)
to support legislation that increases privacy protections or curbs
personalized rulemaking.255 These concerns are not mutually
251. The term arose “because prior to wireless networking it literally meant making sure
there was no cable physically connecting a computer to the public Internet.” Josephine Wolff,
Great, Now Malware Can Jump the “Air Gap” Between Computers, SLATE (Dec. 3, 2013, 5:08
PM), https://slate.com/technology/2013/12/researchers-michael-hanspach-michael-goetz-prove-
malware-can-jump-air-gap-between-computers.html [https://perma.cc/Q9PL-Q9YR].
252. See id. (“[Air gapping] is one of the most drastic, inconvenient, and difficult-to-
maintain computer security measures out there. It’s usually reserved for systems that require
the very highest levels of security, because it leaves you with a computer system that may be
limited in what it can do.”); see also Samuel Joseph O’Malley & Kim-Kwang Raymond Choo,
Bridging the Air Gap: Inaudible Data Exfiltration by Insiders 1, (20th Ams. Conf. on Info.
Sys., 2014), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2431593 [https://perma.cc/
XV25-7DLB].
253. See, e.g., Arthur Allen, ‘We Took a Broken System and Just Broke It Completely,’
POLITICO (Mar. 8, 2018, 5:05 AM), https://www.politico.com/story/2018/03/08/veterans-mili
tary-health-system-trump-386232 [https://perma.cc/B76G-DRV9].
254. Cf. Seligman, supra note 134, at 13-14.
255. Cf. European Parliament and Council Regulation 2016/679, 2016 O.J. (L 119) 1, 1-2
(providing an example of regulations designed to increase privacy protection for personal
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exclusive. Taken together, they suggest that regulators themselves
may not wish to target rules as specifically as they could.
Corporations have encountered a variant of this problem. As
noted earlier, Target uses big data techniques to identify shoppers,
such as pregnant women, who are likely to buy specific items.256 It
then sends customers coupon books showcasing products that are
likely to be of particular interest.257 Target found that people did not
like receiving hyper-targeted coupon books.258 People were uncom-
fortable that Target knew such personal things about them—that
they recently became pregnant, for example—without being told.259
Target responded by making its coupon books less personalized; it
intentionally added coupons for items that recipients would not
want to purchase.260 This made the recipients feel as if the coupons
for items they did want to purchase—the crib pictured next to the
bar stool or bocce ball set—were fortuitous coincidences and not the
result of intrusive data gathering.261 As one Target executive put it:
[W]e started mixing in all these ads for things we knew pregnant
women would never buy, so the baby ads looked random. We’d
put an ad for a lawn mower next to diapers. We’d put a coupon
for wineglasses next to infant clothes. That way, it looked like all
the products were chosen by chance.
And we found out that as long as a pregnant woman thinks she
hasn’t been spied on, she’ll use the coupons. She just assumes
that everyone else on her block got the same mailer for diapers
and cribs. As long as we don’t spook her, it works.262
Other companies have had similar experiences. Credit card com-
panies have identified a wide range of purchasing behaviors that
indicate that a customer has become more or less likely to pay her
data).
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debts.263 For instance, buying carbon-monoxide detectors, name-
brand automotive oil, or “those little felt pads that stop chair legs
from scratching the floor” were associated with strong creditworthi-
ness.264 Charges at pawn shops, for marital therapy, or even at
specific bars were associated with decreased creditworthiness.265
However, companies generally made little use of this information
because executives were “scared that people will resent companies
for knowing too much” and “because they worried that customers
would revolt if they found out they were being studied so closely.”266
These experiences suggest that regulators may also prefer to
employ incompletely personalized laws, even if it results in a poorer
matching of circumstances to legal outcomes.
C. Regulatory Authority
Even making the heroic assumption that regulators can access all
of the necessary information, they may lack the legal authority or
the political will to thwart gamesmanship. Suppose that the
transportation authority knows that Dr. Garcia is running late
because she tried to game the system and shorten her commute.
What will it do with that information? If it fails to prioritize her
commute, Dr. Garcia will suffer—and so will her patient.267 Faced
263. Duhigg, supra note 104.
264. Id. Buying “premium birdseed and a device called a ‘snow roof rake’ that homeowners
use to remove high-up snowdrifts so they don’t fall on pedestrians” were also strong positive
indicators of creditworthiness. Id.
265. Id. (“[D]ata indicated those [charges] were signs of desperation or depression that
might lead to job loss.” Researchers identified “the ‘riskiest’ drinking establishment in Canada
[was] Sharx Pool Bar in Montreal, where 47 percent of the patrons who used their Canadian
Tire card missed four payments over 12 months.”). Buying a “chrome-skull car accessory or
a ‘Mega Thruster Exhaust System’” was also a bad sign. Id.
266. Id. The FTC successfully challenged a credit provider that based credit restrictions
on an undisclosed behavioral scoring model that penalized customers for using their credit
cards for certain transactions, such as marriage counseling, therapy, or tire repair services.
See Complaint for Permanent Injunction & Other Equitable Relief at 34-35, FTC v.
CompuCredit Corp., No. 1:08-CV-1976 (N.D. Ga. June 10, 2008), https://www.ftc.gov/sites/
default/files/documents/cases/2008/06/080610compucreditcmptsigned.pdf [https://perma.cc/
4WPL-CMZT]; Stipulated Order for Permanent Injunction & Other Equitable Relief Against
Defendant CompuCredit Corp. at 3, FTC v. CompuCredit Corp., No. 1:08-CV-1976 (N.D. Ga.
Dec. 19, 2008), https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/cases/2008/12/081219compu
creditstiporder.pdf [https://perma.cc/338X-ULPJ].
267. See supra text accompanying notes 191-93.
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with this choice, it would be very difficult for the regulator not to
give Dr. Garcia beneficial treatment and speed her off to work.268
Giving the regulator a wider set of responsive options can
ameliorate this problem. Perhaps the transportation authority could
speed Dr. Garcia to work but then slow her commute home by a
comparable amount. Alternatively, perhaps it could impose a fine on
Dr. Garcia. If the regulator is a state actor, there are potentially a
wide range of options available to it.269 But if the creators and
enforcers of personalized law are predominantly private actors, as
some have predicted, then the regulator’s powers may be restricted
to a more narrowly circumscribed domain.270
A private transportation authority may have sufficient options to
deal with the delinquent doctor. But what to do with Bob and his
damaged liver? Even if regulators know for certain that he drank
champagne with the intent of damaging his liver, ignoring his new
state could be a death sentence. The medical authority could punish
him by providing him worse medical care, but this also seems
ghoulish. Perhaps the medical authority could impose fines, but it
might take a very high fine to dissuade Bob from moving himself up
the queue. And what if Bob cannot pay? Would the medical
authority have the ability to subject Bob to criminal punishment?
These kinds of heavy-handed responses could be extremely
unpopular, which raises two related problems. First, it may reduce
the likelihood that regulators will be granted the authority to take
these actions. Second, even if regulators are authorized to take
268. This dilemma matches a game theory concept known as subgame perfection.
Essentially, for a particular strategy combination to be sustainable, every actor in the
sequence must be willing to act according to its stated strategy in every possible outcome. See
FUDENBERG & TIROLE, supra note 175, at 69-74. The transportation authority can try to
discourage the doctor from waiting to leave for work by threatening not to prioritize her travel
if she does. But if, when it comes down to it, the transportation authority is not willing to
delay the doctor on her way to work, the doctor can essentially call their bluff by delaying her
trip and forcing the transportation authority to either speed her to work or suffer the
consequences of her being late. This renders the transportation authority’s threat ineffective.
269. See Verstein, supra note 9, at 578 (“When optimal personalization turns on global
knowledge and this information cannot be shared with private actors, the government may
be the appropriate personalizing body.”).
270. See id. at 579 (noting that private regulators may confront “legitimacy objections”
when issuing personalized law).
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these actions, political concerns may make regulators reticent to use
that power.271
Personalized law could also be politically unpopular for a different
reason: individuals will vary in their ability to circumvent personal-
ized law. For example, sophisticated parties will generally have a
greater ability to manipulate a complicated regulatory system than
less sophisticated parties.272 Accordingly, the gaming of personalized
law can raise issues of equity—on top of the underlying issues of
equity already inherent to personalized law.273 Regulators may
worry that popular concerns about equity will make personalized
law politically unpopular and thus infeasible.274 This popularity
concern will push regulators toward a lower level of legal personal-
ization.
Regulators can limit regulated parties’ ability to circumvent
personalized law by focusing on characteristics that regulated
parties cannot easily change.275 However, regulating based on
immutable (or quasi-immutable) characteristics raises a number of
concerns.276 The political process often translates those concerns into
legal limitations on the consideration of such characteristics.
First, many immutable or quasi-immutable characteristics—race,
ethnicity, gender, sexual orientation, national origin, religious
identity, medical status, and disability, to name a few—are social
and political flashpoints.277 Regulating on any of these bases is at
271. See, e.g., Paula Mejia, IRS Under Microscope After John Oliver Televangelism
Segment, NEWSWEEK (Aug. 23, 2015, 1:28 PM), https://www.newsweek.com/irs-under-
microscope-after-john-oliver-televangelism-segment-365291 [https://perma.cc/UX6S-LMSK]
(“The IRS conducted a mere three audits of churches in 2013-2014, and had suspended them
entirely between 2009 and 2013.”); Our Lady of Perpetual Exemption, WIKIPEDIA, https://en.
wikipedia.org/wiki/Our_Lady_of_Perpetual_Exemption [https://perma.cc/5J24-YA76] (descri-
bing John Oliver’s stunt church, created to highlight the lax IRS regulation of churches).
272. Depersonalized laws often exhibit the same dynamic. See, e.g., Parag A. Pathak &
Tayfun Sönmez, Leveling the Playing Field: Sincere and Sophisticated Players in the Boston
Mechanism, 98 AM. ECON. REV. 1636, 1637-38 (2008) (finding that sophisticated students
could better manipulate a public school admissions system). Thus, whether personalized law
improves upon or exacerbates this issue will depend on the specific circumstances. See id.
273. See Fleischer, supra note 190, at 229-30 (noting the ethical problems associated with
regulatory gamesmanship).
274. Of course, regulators may also be concerned about these issues of equity directly. That
would further push regulators toward a lesser degree of personalization.
275. See Porat & Strahilevitz, supra note 3, at 1454.
276. See, e.g., Seligman, supra note 134, at 14.
277. Distinguishing based on immutable characteristics, directly or indirectly, raises deep
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best controversial and, in many instances, deeply and fundamen-
tally objectionable.278 Not surprisingly, a plethora of statutes and
several constitutional provisions forbid various decision makers
from taking these items into account.279
One might think that this would be an easy problem to address:
machines would presumably work out personalized laws by applying
algorithms to data and “machines can be instructed to ignore factors
that we do not want the law to consider. Thus a machine can be told
to ignore race, gender, religion and the like even if they are relevant
to an outcome objective.”280
However, in reality, the problem is much thornier. Even if
machines are not given data on disfavored characteristics, they are
likely to receive other data that can function as proxies.281 Many
neighborhoods exhibit a low degree of racial diversity; an individ-
ual’s address can thus serve as a close proxy for race.282 Knowing
that a person attended a women’s college is a good indicator that
the individual is female. Knowing that a person buys a pine tree
each December is a good indicator that he may be Christian. If
questions of equity and social values. See, e.g., Talia B. Gillis & Jann L. Spiess, Big Data and
Discrimination, 86 U. CHI. L. REV. 459, 485-86 (2019); Dawinder S. Sidhu, Moneyball
Sentencing, 56 B.C. L. REV. 671, 709 (2015); Sonja B. Starr, Evidence-Based Sentencing and
the Scientific Rationalization of Discrimination, 66 STAN. L. REV. 803, 806 (2014). Beyond
these important policy questions, distinguishing on certain immutable characteristics is
unconstitutional. See, e.g., Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954) (holding that racial
segregation in public schools violates the Equal Protection Clause), supplemented by, 349 U.S.
294 (1955); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 210 (1976) (striking down a statute that adopted
different legal drinking ages for men and women for violating the Equal Protection Clause).
278. See, e.g., Seligman, supra note 134, at 14-15; Starr, supra note 277, at 803.
279. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. amends. XIV, XV, XIX, XXVI; 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 2000a, 3604,
3605(a); 15 U.S.C. § 1691(a)(1)-(3). Private organizations sometimes create their own nondis-
criminatory policies as well. See, e.g., Code of Ethics and Business Conduct, SOC’Y FOR HUM.
RES.MGMT., https://www.shrm.org/resourcesandtools/tools-and-samples/policies/pages/code-of-
ethics-conduct-policy.aspx [https://perma.cc/G9CL-RCFX].
280. Casey & Niblett, supra note 1, at 1428.
281. See, e.g., Gillis & Spiess, supra note 277, at 468-71; Talia Gillis, False Dreams of
Algorithmic Fairness: The Case of Credit Pricing 48-53 (Nov. 1, 2019) (unpublished manu-
script), https://scholar.harvard.edu/files/gillis/files/gillis_jmp_191101.pdf [https://perma.cc/
8A5V-QRR4].
282. See, e.g., MARGERY AUSTIN TURNER & JULIE FENDERSON, URB. INST., UNDERSTANDING
DIVERSE NEIGHBORHOODS IN AN ERA OF DEMOGRAPHIC CHANGE 2 (2006), https://www.urban.
org/sites/default/files/publication/50906/411358-Understanding-Diverse-Neighborhoods-in-an-
Era-of-Demographic-Change.PDF [https://perma.cc/76DX-RPFW] (“[A]lmost a quarter of all
tracts in the 100 largest metro areas (23.8 percent) are racially and ethnically exclusive (more
than 90 percent white).”).
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religion is relevant to an outcome of interest,283 then pine tree-
purchasing behavior will also appear relevant to that outcome, even
if it is not, because it is highly correlated with religion—which, by
assumption, is both unobserved and relevant.284 The machines will
effectively use pine tree-purchasing behavior as a proxy for religion
when crafting personalized law.285 In other words, denying the
machines access to specific characteristics that we do not want them
to consider will not prevent the machines from finding indirect ways
to deduce those characteristics.286
283. Any such relevance may itself represent a social problem. For example, race may be
associated with a higher likelihood of arrest if members of some races are more likely to be
stopped and questioned by law enforcement, and thus are more likely to be caught when they
engage in illegal behavior, than members of other races. Indeed, this result could obtain even
when individuals of an over-arrested race engage in illegal behavior less frequently than other
individuals. See, e.g., Solon Barocas & Andrew D. Selbst, Big Data’s Disparate Impact, 104
CALIF. L. REV. 671, 687 (2016); Anupam Chander, The Racist Algorithm?, 115 MICH. L. REV.
1023, 1036-39 (2017).
284. See, e.g., Kevin A. Clarke, The Phantom Menace: Omitted Variable Bias in Econometric
Research, 22 CONFLICT MGMT. & PEACE SCI. 341, 343 (2005); Bernard E. Harcourt, Risk as a
Proxy for Race, CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL’Y 2 (Univ. Chi., Olin L. & Econ. Working Paper,
Paper No. 535, Pub. L. & Legal Theory Working Paper No. 323, 2010), http://papers.ssrn.com/
sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1677654 [https://perma.cc/DV4M-U6W3].
285. Of course, the machines will not know that they are doing this, but that is presumably
little consolation. Moreover, it may be difficult to tell whether and to what extent the
machines are using a particular piece of data for its own sake or as a proxy for prohibited
considerations. See, e.g., Chander, supra note 283, at 1036-39. For example, knowing some-
one’s address gives you information not only about her race but also about the weather, air
and water pollution, crime, and noise to which she is exposed. This complicates the data
oversight problem.
286. See Gillis, supra note 281, at 52-62. Antidiscrimination laws generally prohibit
discrimination based on indirect proxies for prohibited considerations, and many allow claims
based on disparate impact, that is, facially neutral conduct that has discriminatory effects.
See, e.g., Tex. Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty. Affs. v. Inclusive Cmtys. Project, Inc., 576 U.S. 519, 525
(2015) (confirming that disparate impact claims can be made under the Fair Housing Act);
Ramirez v. GreenPoint Mortg. Funding, Inc., 633 F. Supp. 2d 922, 926-27 (N.D. Cal. 2008)
(allowing a disparate impact claim under the Equal Credit Opportunity Act). Even if indirect
algorithmic consideration of such characteristics were legal, that legality would not address
many of the moral or philosophical objections to taking such considerations into account.
It is worth noting that personalized law, with its increased use of algorithmic decision-
making, could make it easier to root out discrimination; unlike with a human decision maker,
one can often see exactly what an algorithm considered when making its decision and how
changes in circumstances would change that decision. See, e.g., Jon Kleinberg, Jens Ludwig,
Sendhil Mullainathan & Cass R. Sunstein, Discrimination in the Age of Algorithms, 10 J.
LEGAL ANALYSIS 113, 114 (2018) (“Crucially, these benefits will only be realized if policy
changes are adopted.... [W]ithout the appropriate safeguards, the prospects for detecting
discrimination in a world of unregulated algorithm design could become even more serious
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Moreover, regulating based on immutable characteristics raises
concerns even when it does not touch on prominent social fault
lines. For example, consider one source of data that could be useful
for personalized law: DNA, our genetic code. One’s DNA is difficult
to alter, and genes may be associated with a number of items of in-
terest, including predisposition to diseases,287 physical traits,288 and
behaviors.289 Some of the information contained in DNA implicates
the flashpoints described above,290 but much of it does not.291 DNA
might therefore constitute useful data that decision makers could
take into account, provided they meet appropriate safeguards.
However, concerns over the use of genetic data led Congress to enact
the Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act of 2008 (GINA).292
GINA prohibits health insurance companies from using genetic test
results to determine coverage costs, and employers from using
than they currently are.”). In any event, personalized law will not eliminate all objectionable
discrimination, and thus this issue will persist to some degree.
287. See, e.g., Laura J. van’t Veer, Hongyue Dai, Marc J. van de Vijver, Yudong D. He,
Augustinus A. M. Hart, Mao Mao, Hans L. Peterse, Karin van der Kooy, Matthew J. Marton,
Anke T. Witteveen, George J. Schreiber, Ron M. Kerkhoven, Chris Roberts, Peter S. Linsley,
René Bernards & Stephen H. Friend, Gene Expression Profiling Predicts Clinical Outcome of
Breast Cancer, 415 NATURE 530, 532 (2002).
288. See, e.g., Hana Lango Allen et al., Letter, Hundreds of Variants Clustered in Genomic
Loci and Biological Pathways Affect Human Height, 467 NATURE 832, 832 (2010); S. Craig
Roberts, Anthony C. Little, L. Morris Gosling, David I. Perrett, Vaughan Carter, Benedict C.
Jones, Ian Penton-Voak & Marion Petrie, MHC-Heterozygosity and Human Facial
Attractiveness, 26 EVOLUTION & HUM. BEHAV. 213, 213 (2005); cf. Irene Hanson Frieze,
Josephine E. Olson & June Russell, Attractiveness and Income for Men and Women in
Management, 21 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCH. 1039, 1052 (1991); Timothy A. Judge & Daniel M.
Cable, The Effect of Physical Height on Workplace Success and Income: Preliminary Test of
a Theoretical Model, 89 J. APPLIED PSYCH. 428, 437-38 (2004).
289. See, e.g., Justin R. Garcia, James MacKillop, Edward L. Aller, Ann M. Merriwether,
David Sloan Wilson & J. Koji Lum, Associations Between Dopamine D4 Receptor Gene
Variation with Both Infidelity and Sexual Promiscuity, 5 PLOS ONE 1, 4 (2010); Kerry L.
Jang, W. John Livesley & Philip A. Vernon, Heritability of the Big Five Personality
Dimensions and Their Facets: A Twin Study, 64 J. PERSONALITY 577, 577 (1996); Porat &
Strahilevitz, supra note 3, at 1469-70 (“Personality seems to have a strong genetic component
and be heritable.”).
290. For example, the presence of “XX” or “XY” chromosome pairs would tell one a lot about
a person’s gender.
291. See, e.g., Scientists Identify Genes Associated with Violent Crime, IFLSCIENCE, https://
www.iflscience.com/brain/genes-associated-violent-crimes-identified/ [https://perma.cc/4USR-
RM5F]; Gene Linked to Needing Less Sleep Identified, SCI.DAILY (Aug. 28, 2019), https://www.
sciencedaily.com/releases/2019/08/190828111247.htm [https://perma.cc/43X2-AFVX].
292. Pub. L. No. 110-233, 122 Stat. 881.
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genetic information to make hiring, firing, and promotion deci-
sions.293 This precedent illustrates how popular concerns may limit
regulatory regimes based on characteristics that are difficult for
regulated parties to manipulate.
Unpopularity has already constrained private actors’ use of big
data. For instance, customers have generally reacted very nega-
tively to the use of big data to price discriminate.294 To take one
example, in 2000, a customer appeared to catch Amazon personaliz-
ing the price of a DVD, offering him a price that was four dollars
more than that offered to other potential buyers.295 Amazon CEO
Jeff Bezos apologized personally, and Amazon gave refunds to
thousands of customers.296 Some commentators have speculated
that, in the age of social media, a similar incident today could lead
to a boycott.297 Amazon now claims that it does not use much of the
data to which it has access—such as where a customer lives, her
browsing history, and what she has previously bought on Ama-
zon—when setting prices.298
Other companies have been caught engaging in price discrimina-
tion and found themselves pilloried in major news outlets. The Wall
Street Journal found that Staples engaged in price discrimination,
293. Id. at 883, 896, 907.
294. See Kominers, supra note 18; Adam Tanner, Different Customers, Different Prices,
Thanks to Big Data, FORBES (Mar. 26, 2014, 6:00 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/adam
tanner/2014/03/26/different-customers-different-prices-thanks-to-big-data/?sh=5c3b100346bd
[https://perma.cc/T8TV-D99L]. See generally Eric T. Anderson & Duncan I. Simester, Price
Stickiness and Customer Antagonism, 125 Q.J.ECONOMICS 729 (2010) (investigating how price
stickiness affects consumer behavior); Daniel Kahneman, Jack L. Knetsch & Richard Thaler,
Fairness as a Constraint on Profit Seeking: Entitlements in the Market, 76 AM.ECON.REV. 728
(1986) (analyzing how fairness concerns, including customer reactions to price setting,
constrain firms’ behavior).
295. Brian Wallheimer, Are You Ready for Personalized Pricing?, CHI. BOOTH REV. (Feb.
26, 2018), https://review.chicagobooth.edu/marketing/2018/article/are-you-ready-personalized-
pricing [https://perma.cc/QG98-EH84]. Amazon claimed that the company was not price
discriminating, but was instead offering random prices to determine how to optimally price
products. Id.
296. Id.
297. See id. Amazon’s customers have also brought several lawsuits against the company
challenging its discriminatory pricing. See, e.g., Abel, supra note 221 (discussing lawsuits
alleging that the interaction of Amazon’s personalized pricing and its Amazon Prime
memberships created unlawful results).
298. See Michael J. Martinez, Amazon Error May End ‘Dynamic Pricing’, ABC NEWS
(Jan. 7, 2006, 7:29 AM), https://abcnews.go.com/Technology/story?id=119399&page=1 [https://
perma.cc/U3TP-XV3F].
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offering lower prices to customers who lived close to rivals such as
OfficeMax or Office Depot.299 Commentators then criticized Sta-
ples for charging higher prices to poorer and rural customers.300
Orbitz “charged Mac users as much as 30% more than PC users” for
lodging, then discontinued the practice after the conduct was pub-
licized.301 Travelocity, Home Depot, Rosetta Stone, and other com-
panies allegedly engaged in similar behaviors as well.302 Companies’
responses to these stories demonstrate just how concerned they are
about bad press and popular backlash.303
Popular outrage and opprobrium may be at least as big a problem
for a regulator, which is at the mercy of the political process, as it is
for private companies. Political roadblocks may thus limit regula-
tors’ ability to implement personalized laws, especially personalized
laws that draw fine distinctions. And, as noted above, fine distinc-
tions may be impossible in any event due to the data muddling or
privacy concerns of regulated parties.304
D. Transparency 
People’s reactions to personalized laws will depend on their level
of trust in the relevant regulatory body. In a democracy, transpar-
ency is a key determinant of people’s comfort levels. If regulators
are shielded from oversight, citizens may worry about corruption,
299. Jennifer Valentino-DeVries, Jeremy Singer-Vine & Ashkan Soltani, Websites Vary
Prices, Deals Based on Users’ Information, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 24, 2012), https://www.wsj.com/
articles/SB10001424127887323777204578189391813881534 [https://perma.cc/6NBF-7M3V].
300. See, e.g., Devindra Hardawar, Staples, Home Depot, and Other Online Stores Change
Prices Based on Your Location, VENTURE BEAT (Dec. 24, 2012, 6:48 AM), https://venturebeat.
com/2012/12/24/staples-online-stores-price-changes/ [https://perma.cc/8WUZ-ANBP]; Cathy
O’Neil, Staples.com Rips Off Poor People; Let’s Take Control of Our Online Personas,
MATHBABE (Aug. 22, 2013), https://mathbabe.org/2013/08/22/staples-com-rips-off-poor-people-
lets-take-control-of-our-online-personas/ [https://perma.cc/823A-QNDT].
301. Elizabeth Dwoskin, Why You Can’t Trust You’re Getting the Best Deal Online, WALL
ST. J. (Oct. 23, 2014, 12:01 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/why-you-cant-trust-youre-
getting-the-best-deal-online-1414036862 [https://perma.cc/S9F4-XVTA]; see Valentino-DeVries
et al., supra note 299.
302. Dwoskin, supra note 301; Valentino-DeVries et al., supra note 299.
303. See, e.g., Dwoskin, supra note 301; Valentino-DeVries et al., supra note 299; cf.
Victoria L. Schwartz, Corporate Privacy Failures Start at the Top, 57 B.C. L. REV. 1693, 1693
(2016) (arguing that corporate executives are selected not to value privacy, and that this
makes it harder for them to anticipate when others will be upset by privacy intrusions).
304. See supra Parts III.A-B.
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improper use of data, and other bad behavior.305 By contrast, if it is
easy to see what regulators are doing, there will be less opportunity
for regulatory malfeasance, and people will be more willing to
empower regulators.306
At the same time, the more that regulators disclose about how
their algorithms work, the easier it will be for regulated parties to
manipulate those algorithms.307 The transparency required for
appropriate oversight thus makes it harder to create an incentive-
compatible system. Accommodating these constraints may mean
accepting a system that matches circumstances to results in a
suboptimal way.
A number of constraints may further complicate society’s
attempts to strike the right balance on transparency. First, people
are anxious about machines taking on tasks, including decision-
making, that have traditionally been left to humans.308 As a result,
they tend to hold machines to a higher standard, demanding more
accuracy from a machine than they would from a human performing
the same task.309 The news cycle can reinforce this dynamic; in these
contexts, human error may be routine and thus not newsworthy in
a way that machine errors are. For example, many experts believe
that self-driving cars are safer than human-driven cars, but the
public disagrees and many states do not permit autonomous
vehicles on public roads.310 A human-driven car kills a pedestrian in
305. See B. Peter Rosendorff & John A. Doces, Transparency and Unfair Eviction in
Democracies and Autocracies, 12 SWISS POL. SCI. REV. 99, 102 (2011).
306. Id. at 102, 111.
307. Cf. Porat & Strahilevitz, supra note 3, at 1455 (stating that confidential algorithms
are harder to manipulate).
308. See, e.g., Casey & Niblett, supra note 1, at 1444 (“[P]eople are generally uncomfortable
with allowing machines to make important ethical decisions.”); Olivia Solon, More Than 70%
of U.S. Fears Robots Taking Over Our Lives, Survey Finds, GUARDIAN (Oct. 4, 2017, 1:15 PM),
https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2017/oct/04/robots-artificial-intelligence-machines-
us-survey [https://perma.cc/FB6K-PV7M].
309. See Paul Slovic, Perception of Risk, 236 SCIENCE 280, 280 (1987). Of course, this may
change over time as people become increasingly comfortable with machines operating in this
sphere. The reverse could also be true. Either way, this dynamic is likely to apply in the short
term. Cf. Casey & Niblett, supra note 1, at 1427 (“[H]umans increasingly place their trust in
machines and discover that outcomes predicted by big data are systematically better than
human intuition.”).
310. See, e.g., Solon, supra note 308 (“Fifty-six [percent of Americans] said they would not
want to ride in [a self-driving car] if given the opportunity, citing a lack of trust in the
technology or an unwillingness to cede control to a machine in a potentially life-or-death
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the United States roughly every ninety minutes; each of these
deaths, though tragic, gets little public attention.311 However, when
a self-driving car killed a pedestrian in March 2018, it was major
national news.312 Popular concerns about automated decision-
making may require regulators to provide a great deal of transpar-
ency when they use the automated tools that personalized law
envisions.313
Second, private parties will likely develop much of the machinery
underlying personalized law.314 These private parties will generally
push to keep the details of their algorithms secret to hide them from
situation.”); Autonomous Vehicles | Self-Driving Vehicles Enacted Legislation, NAT’L CONF.
OF STATE LEGISLATURES (Feb. 18, 2020), http://www.ncsl.org/research/transportation/autono
mous-vehicles-self-driving-vehicles-enacted-legislation.aspx [https://perma.cc/SK3Z-THBY];
cf. Peter Hancock, Are Autonomous Cars Really Safer Than Human Drivers?, SCI. AM. (Feb.
3, 2018), https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/are-autonomous-cars-really-safer-than-
human-drivers/ [https://perma.cc/EER2-DRRS] (questioning whether self-driving cars are
preferable to human-driven cars).
311. See, e.g., Chris Isidore, Self-Driving Cars Are Already Really Safe, CNN (Mar. 21,
2018, 12:07 PM), https://money.cnn.com/2018/03/21/technology/self-driving-car-safety/ [https://
perma.cc/EFX3-N87F].
312. See, e.g., Daisuke Wakabayashi, Self-Driving Uber Car Kills Pedestrian in Arizona,
Where Robots Roam, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 19, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/19/
technology/uber-driverless-fatality.html [https://perma.cc/9THX-8LQT]; Isidore, supra note
311; Russ Mitchell, Self-Driving Cars May Ultimately Be Safer than Human Drivers. But After
a Pedestrian’s Death, Will the Public Buy It?, L.A. TIMES (Mar. 21, 2018, 5:00 AM),
https://www.latimes.com/business/autos/la-fi-hy-robot-car-safety-pr-20180321-story.html
[https://perma.cc/6S6G-WQ6X].
313. These concerns may fade over time as people become more used to, and thus more
comfortable with, machines acting in this capacity. See, e.g., Casey & Niblett, Self-Driving
Laws, supra note 3, at 436 (discussing lasting but now-faded concern over automatic
elevators). People might also have the opposite reaction, becoming more concerned if bad
outcomes receive widespread news coverage. See, e.g., Thomas Germain, How to Use Facebook
Privacy Settings, CONSUMER REPS. (Oct. 7, 2020), https://www.consumerreports.org/privacy/
facebook-privacy-settings/#:~:text=On%20a%20computer%3A%20Go%20to,%22%20
and%20%22Social%20Interactions.%22 [https://perma.cc/4HWZ-7X5H] (describing consumers’
privacy concerns stemming from scandals surrounding Facebook’s data collection, including
its use of automated facial recognition technology on users’ accounts); Doug Gross, Survey: 1
in 4 Users Lie on Facebook, CNN (May 4, 2012, 2:11 PM), https://www.cnn.com/2012/05/04/
tech/social-media/facebook-lies-privacy/index.html [https://perma.cc/JHU8-M44F] (“25% of
users said they falsified information in their profiles to protect their identity ... up from 10%
... two years ago.”). In any event, this concern is likely to be an issue initially.
314. See, e.g., Jason Tashea, Courts Are Using AI to Sentence Criminals. That Must Stop
Now, WIRED (Apr. 17, 2017, 7:00 AM), https://www.wired.com/2017/04/courts-using-ai-
sentence-criminals-must-stop-now/ [https://perma.cc/4TDF-HK8D] (“Typically, government
agencies do not write their own algorithms; they buy them from private businesses.”); Angwin
et al., supra note 83 (discussing COMPAS and other privately developed predictive software).
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competitors.315 Private developers’ desire for secrecy may make it
difficult for the government to provide transparency to citizens.316
This problem is complicated by regulated parties’ constitutional and
statutory information rights.317
For example, consider the COMPAS software program.318
COMPAS evaluates a wide range of data and assesses how likely a
criminal defendant is to commit additional crimes.319 It also predicts
how various interventions (such as drug treatment programs,
counseling services, or housing assistance) will affect a defendant’s
chances of reoffending.320 State and local authorities in many states
use COMPAS scores when making bail decisions, sentencing
determinations, and parole decisions.321 Defendants and their
counsel generally receive their COMPAS scores but are not told the
details of how those scores were calculated.322
315. See, e.g., Simson L. Garfinkel, A Peek at Proprietary Algorithms, 105 AM. SCIENTIST
326 (2017), https://www.americanscientist.org/article/a-peek-at-proprietary-algorithms
[https://perma.cc/J6JN-T5DB]; Rebecca Wexler, Life, Liberty, and Trade Secrets: Intellectual
Property in the Criminal Justice System, 70 STAN. L. REV. 1343, 1343 (2018) (arguing that
trade secrets should not be privileged in criminal proceedings).
316. See, e.g., Wexler, supra note 315, at 1349-50.
317. See, e.g., FRANK PASQUALE, THE BLACK BOX SOCIETY: THE SECRET ALGORITHMS THAT
CONTROL MONEY AND INFORMATION 165-66, 193 (2015); Danielle Keats Citron & Frank
Pasquale, The Scored Society: Due Process for Automated Predictions, 89 WASH. L. REV. 1, 17
(2014). Much of the outside knowledge of Target’s use of big data comes from a New York
Times Magazine article in which a Target statistician spoke to a reporter. See Duhigg, supra
note 15. After Target learned that the statistician was speaking to the journalist, it asked
him to stop, and he did. Id.
318. COMPAS is an acronym for Correctional Offender Management Profiling for
Alternative Sanctions. Angwin et al., supra note 83.
319. Id. Technically, COMPAS predicts how likely similarly situated defendants are to
commit crimes, as compared to the specific defendant at issue. State v. Loomis, 881 N.W.2d
749, 754 (Wis. 2016).
320. See Angwin et al., supra note 83.
321. Id. (identifying Florida and Wisconsin jurisdictions as using COMPAS scores to make
bail decisions; Arizona, Colorado, Delaware, Kentucky, Louisiana, Oklahoma, Virginia,
Washington, and Wisconsin as states in which judges receive risk assessment scores from
COMPAS or a competitor program at the time of sentencing; Wisconsin as using COMPAS
scores to make parole decisions); see also Cecelia Klingele, The Promises and Perils of
Evidence-Based Corrections, 91 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 537, 551-52, 582-83 n.202 (2015).
322. Angwin et al., supra note 83; see also State v. Walls, No. 116,027, 2017 WL 2709819,
at *1, *4 (Kan. Ct. App. June 23, 2017) (vacating the sentence of a defendant who received
only the cover page of a report prepared by another algorithmic assessment tool (the Level of
Service Inventory-Revised, or “LSI-R”), instead of the whole report, on the ground that he was
denied his rights under section 21-6704(a)(1) of the Kansas Code and his constitutional right
to due process of law).
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This was the experience of Eric Loomis.323 In 2013, he was
arrested driving a car that had been used recently in a drive-by
shooting.324 He pled guilty to attempting to flee an officer and no
contest to operating a vehicle without the owner’s consent; he hoped
to receive probation.325 Instead, he was sentenced to six years in
prison, in part because he was “identified, through the COMPAS
assessment, as an individual who is at high risk to the commu-
nity.”326 Loomis was given the COMPAS score, but he was not given
access to the details of how the score was calculated.327 He chal-
lenged his sentence as violating his constitutional right to due
process, both “because the proprietary nature of COMPAS pre-
vent[ed him] from challenging the COMPAS assessment’s scientific
validity” and because COMPAS assessments consider a defendant’s
gender.328
The Wisconsin Supreme Court ruled against Loomis, affirming
his sentence.329 Nonetheless, the ruling calls into question what role
COMPAS and similar software can play going forward absent in-
creased transparency regarding their algorithms. The court held
that judges can “consider a COMPAS risk assessment at sentenc-
ing” but may not use the score “(1) to determine whether an offender
is incarcerated; or (2) to determine the severity of the sentence.”330
In addition, “risk scores may not be used as the determinative factor
in deciding whether an offender can be supervised safely and
effectively in the community.”331 Commentators have called into
question exactly what courts can use COMPAS for in sentencing.332
323. Loomis, 881 N.W.2d at 754-56.
324. Id. at 754.
325. Id.
326. Id. at 755, 756 n.18. He was also sentenced to five years of extended supervision. Id.
at 756 n.18.
327. Id. at 761.
328. Id. at 753.
329. Id. at 753-54.
330. Id. at 769.
331. Id.
332. As two commentators put it:
For Loomis, the COMPAS output was purportedly used only to “reinforce” the
“assessment of the other factors” considered. The Wisconsin Supreme Court
stated that the sentencing court “would have imposed the exact same sentence
without it. Accordingly, we determine that the circuit court’s consideration of
COMPAS in this case did not violate Loomis’s due process rights.”
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The court also required that judges receiving COMPAS assess-
ments be advised in writing of the assessments’ limitations and of
concerns that have been raised about them.333 The opinion explicitly
leaves open additional lines of attack that Loomis did not raise.334
While the case was pending, Wisconsin stopped including COMPAS
assessments in presentencing reports.335 Three years passed be-
tween Loomis’s initial sentencing and the Wisconsin Supreme
Court’s ruling in the case.336 If other defendants challenge the use
of COMPAS in sentencing in the future, the state may again forbear
from using COMPAS while those cases are pending. That could
translate into significant stretches of time during which the state
does not use COMPAS. Combined, these restrictions and limitations
may render greater algorithmic transparency a necessity as a
practical matter.337
This logic leads to a troubling paradox. On the one hand, if the use of a
proprietary risk assessment tool at sentencing is only appropriate when the
same sentencing decision would be reached without it, this suggests that the
risk assessment plays absolutely no role in probation or sentencing decisions. If
that is the case, then why use it at all? If, on the other hand, it may have a
potential impact—despite the Wisconsin court’s assertion to the contrary—then
the due process question can’t be pushed aside.
John Villasenor & Virginia Foggo, Algorithms and Sentencing: What Does Due Process
Require?, BROOKINGS (Mar. 21, 2019), https://www.brookings.edu/blog/techtank/2019/03/21/
algorithms-and-sentencing-what-does-due-process-require/ [https://perma.cc/EV89-HN6W].
333. Loomis, 881 N.W.2d at 769-70.
334. Notably, the court discussed Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976): 
[Boren was] a case where the United States Supreme Court concluded that an
Oklahoma law that prohibited the sale of 3.2% beer to men under the age 21 and
to women under the age of 18 violated the [E]qual [P]rotection [C]lause of the
Fourteenth Amendment. The Court explained that although state officials
offered sociological or empirical justifications for the gender-based difference in
the law, “the principles embodied in the Equal Protection Clause are not to be
rendered inapplicable by statistically measured but loose-fitting generalities
concerning the drinking tendencies of aggregate groups.”
Id. at 766. The court then noted that because Loomis had raised a due process argument
instead of an equal protection argument, the court need not decide the equal protection
question. Id.; see also Starr, supra note 277, at 803 (arguing that the use of certain actuarial
recidivism risk prediction instruments violates the Equal Protection Clause).
335. Angwin et al., supra note 83.
336. Loomis was sentenced on August 12, 2013, and the Wisconsin Supreme Court ruled
on July 13, 2016. See Loomis, 881 N.W.2d at 749; Brief of Defendant-Appellant, at 2, Loomis,
881 N.W.2d 749 (No. 2015AP000157).
337. See generally Danielle Keats Citron, Technological Due Process, 85 WASH. U. L. REV.
1249 (2008) (discussing the procedural defects associated with automation and calling for
transparency in algorithmic decision-making).
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There are many other examples of regulated parties’ information
rights colliding with private parties’ desires for secrecy regarding
their proprietary algorithms. For instance, criminal defendants
have challenged the admissibility of DNA identifications on the
ground that the government did not provide the source code of the
software that made the DNA match.338 Such arguments have
sometimes proven successful.339 In another instance, the Arkansas
Department of Human Services attempted to start allocating care
to beneficiaries based on algorithmic assessments.340 Beneficiaries
who were losing care sued the state, alleging that their right to due
process had been violated (“Arkansas DHS Litigation”), and won.341
A similar story played out in Idaho.342
But even the concept of transparency is tricky when it comes to
algorithms.343 Most citizens understand neither the advanced
mathematical techniques underlying machine learning algorithms,
nor the source code implementing them.344 Thus, most people will
have a difficult time grasping the mechanics of how an algorithm
operates, even if the underlying source code is disclosed.345 The
Arkansas DHS Litigation provides a stark and almost comic
example: The software Arkansas used to assign care was designed
338. See, e.g., People v. Wakefield, 107 N.Y.S.3d 487, 492-93 (App. Div. 2019); Christian
Chessman, Note, A “Source” of Error: Computer Code, Criminal Defendants, and the Con-
stitution, 105 CALIF. L. REV. 179, 205-14 (2017) (explaining reasons why courts deny de-
fendants access to source code).
339. See, e.g., Matthew Shaer, The False Promise of DNA Testing, ATLANTIC (June 2016),
https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2016/06/a-reasonable-doubt/480747/
[https://perma.cc/LHA6-4YVX] (describing one judge’s ruling that particular DNA profiling
evidence was inadmissible).
340. See Colin Lecher, What Happens When an Algorithm Cuts Your Health Care, VERGE
(Mar. 21, 2018, 9:00 AM), https://www.theverge.com/2018/3/21/17144260/healthcare-medicaid-
algorithm-arkansas-cerebral-palsy [https://perma.cc/R9JG-PDZK].
341. See MEREDITH WHITTAKER, KATE CRAWFORD, ROEL DOBBE, GENEVIEVE FRIED,
ELIZABETH KAZIUNAS, VAROON MATHUR, SARAH MYERS WEST, RASHIDA RICHARDSON, JASON
SCHULTZ & OSCAR SCHWARTZ, AI NOW INST., AI NOW REPORT 2018, at 18 (2018),
https://ainowinstitute.org/AI_Now_2018_Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/9GRK-XX8N].
342. Lecher, supra note 340.
343. See generally Robert H. Sloan & Richard Warner, When Is an Algorithm Transparent?:
Predictive Analytics, Privacy, and Public Policy, IEEE: SEC. & PRIV., May 2018 (discussing
algorithmic transparency concerns in the context of consumer transactions).
344. Cf. Casey & Niblett, supra note 25, at 355.
345. See Joshua A. Kroll, Joanna Huey, Solon Barocas, Edward W. Felten, Joel R.
Reidenberg, David G. Robinson & Harlan Yu, Accountable Algorithms, 165 U.PA.L.REV. 633,
638 (2017).
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by a nonprofit coalition called InterRAI.346 At one point, plaintiffs
called in Brant Fries, president of InterRAI, to testify about how the
algorithm worked.347 Plaintiffs’ counsel asked Fries to apply the
algorithm to one of the plaintiffs to demonstrate how it worked.348
At that point, Fries realized that the wrong calculation had been
conducted, and the state agreed to restore that plaintiff’s pre-
algorithm level of care.349 As plaintiffs’ counsel summarized the
situation:
Of course we’re gratified that DHS has reported the error and
certainly happy that it’s been found, but that almost proves the
point of the case.... There’s this immensely complex system
around which no standards have been published, so that no one
in their agency caught it until we initiated federal litigation and
spent hundreds of hours and thousands of dollars to get here
today.350
As challenging as it can be to understand a complicated algo-
rithm’s nuts and bolts, understanding its full implications is even
harder.351 For example, COMPAS does not consider a defendant’s
race directly, but it does consider factors that correlate with race.352





351. See, e.g., Ruha Benjamin, Assessing Risk, Automating Racism, 366 SCIENCE 421, 421
(2019); Ziad Obermeyer, Brian Powers, Christine Vogeli & Sendhil Mullainathan, Dissecting
Racial Bias in an Algorithm Used to Manage the Health of Populations, 366 SCIENCE 447, 447
(2019) (finding that a commonly used commercial algorithm discriminates against Black
patients because it uses patient care costs as a proxy for health needs; because less money is
spent on Black patients’ healthcare than on white patients with comparable health needs,
reliance on spending as a proxy “reduces the number of Black patients identified for extra
care” from 46.5 percent to 17.7 percent); Kleinberg et al., supra note 286, at 114 (“[A]lgorithms
are not decipherable—one cannot determine what an algorithm will do by reading the
underlying code. This is more than a cognitive limitation; it is a mathematical impossibility.
To know what an algorithm will do, one must run it.”).
352. See, e.g., Sam Corbett-Davies, Emma Pierson, Avi Feller & Sharad Goel, A Computer
Program Used for Bail and Sentencing Decisions Was Labeled Biased Against Blacks. It’s
Actually Not That Clear., WASH. POST (Oct. 17, 2016, 5:00 AM), https://www.washington
post.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2016/10/17/can-an-algorithm-be-racist-our-analysis-is-more-
cautious-than-propublicas/ [https://perma.cc/GGM3-BDHC] (“While Northpointe’s algorithm
does not use race directly, many attributes that predict reoffending nonetheless vary by race.
For example, black defendants are more likely to have prior arrests, and because prior arrests
786 WILLIAM & MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 62:723
One might therefore wonder whether the software discriminates
against certain defendants based on their race. ProPublica judged
that it does: it analyzed the COMPAS risk assessment scores for
over seven thousand people arrested in Broward County, Florida,
and concluded that COMPAS discriminates against Black defen-
dants.353 Northpointe, Inc., the company that owns COMPAS,
disputes ProPublica’s findings,354 and other researchers have
predict reoffending, the algorithm flags more black defendants as high risk even though it
does not use race in the classification.”).
353. See Angwin et al., supra note 83. ProPublica found that Black defendants were more
likely to be mischaracterized as having a high risk of re-offending, while white defendants
were more likely to be mischaracterized as having a low risk of reoffending. Id.; Jeff Larson,
Surya Mattu, Lauren Kirchner & Julia Angwin, How We Analyzed the COMPAS Recidivism
Algorithm, PROPUBLICA (May 23, 2016), https://www.propublica.org/article/how-we-analyzed-
the-compas-recidivism-algorithm [https://perma.cc/AQ4W-Q2GQ].
354. WILLIAM DIETERICH, CHRISTINA MENDOZA & TIM BRENNAN, NORTHPOINTE INC. RSCH.
DEP’T, COMPAS RISK SCALES: DEMONSTRATING ACCURACY EQUITY AND PREDICTIVE PARITY
(2016), http://go.volarisgroup.com/rs/430-MBX989/images/ProPublica_Commentary_Final_
070616.pdf [https://perma.cc/Y8EH-CFND] (“present[ing] evidence that refutes the claim that
the COMPAS risk scales [are] biased against black defendants ... in Broward County,
Florida”); see also Julia Angwin & Jeff Larson, ProPublica Responds to Company’s Critique
of Machine Bias Story, PROPUBLICA (July 29, 2016, 11:56 AM), https://www.propublica.org/
article/propublica-responds-to-companys-critique-of-machine-bias-story [https://perma.cc/
Y3VD-2BQ5]; Jeff Larson & Julia Angwin, Technical Response to Northpointe, PROPUBLICA
(July 29, 2016, 11:55 AM), https://www.propublica.org/article/technical-response-to-north
pointe [https://perma.cc/6N7J-JUWL] (responding to Northpointe’s criticisms and standing
by ProPublica’s findings).
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weighed in on the topic.355 COMPAS continues to be widely used,
but its use remains controversial.356
E. Regulatory Conservatism
The problems of information, regulatory authority, and transpar-
ency all feed into each other: If the transportation authority’s
inscrutable algorithm can levy fines or impose arbitrary delays
based on its assessment of travel patterns, regulated parties will
likely want to limit the information that the algorithm can access.
Similarly, if the transportation authority can access vast amounts
of personal information, people are likely to want strong restrictions
on the purposes for which it can use that information and the
actions it can take. These effects limit regulators’ ability to create
incentive-compatible systems and thus personalized law’s ability to
match factual scenarios to legal outcomes.
The complicated sociopolitical landscape surrounding per-
sonalized law may make officials wary about taking actions that
may prove unpopular.357 Because power in the United States is
355. See, e.g., Alexandra Chouldechova, Fair Prediction with Disparate Impact: A Study
of Bias in Recidivism Prediction Instruments 1 (Feb. 28, 2017) (unpublished manuscript) (on
file with Cornell University), https://arxiv.org/pdf/1703.00056.pdf [https://perma.cc/6KB9-
VB8D]; Corbett-Davies et al., supra note 352; Anthony W. Flores, Kristin Bechtel &
Christopher T. Lowenkamp, False Positives, False Negatives, and False Analyses: A Rejoinder
to “Machine Bias: There’s Software Used Across the Country to Predict Future Criminals. And
It’s Biased Against Blacks.”, 80 FED. PROB. 38, 38 (2016); Jon Kleinberg, Sendhil
Mullainathan & Manish Raghavon, Inherent Trade-Offs in the Fair Determination of Risk
Scores 1 (Nov. 17, 2016) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with Cornell University), https://
arxiv.org/pdf/1609.05807.pdf [https://perma.cc/B4XZ-THEJ]; see also Julia Angwin,
ProPublica’s Annotations in Response to Flores Et Al., (Dec. 30, 2016), https://www.document
cloud.org/documents/3248777-Lowenkamp-Fedprobation-sept2016-0.html [https://perma.cc/
F8WF-BLKK]; Julia Angwin & Jeff Larson, Bias in Criminal Risk Scores Is Mathematically
Inevitable, Researchers Say, PROPUBLICA (Dec. 30, 2016, 4:44 PM), https://www.propublica.
org/article/bias-in-criminal-risk-scores-is-mathematically-inevitable-researchers-say
[https://perma.cc/H393-DKT2]; Ziyuan Zhong, A Tutorial on Fairness in Machine Learning,
TOWARDS DATASCI. (Oct. 21, 2018), https://towardsdatascience.com/a-tutorial-on-fairness-in-
machine-learning-3ff8ba1040cb [https://perma.cc/26ZD-Y5TK]; Moritz Hardt, Eric Rice &
Nathan Srebro, Equality of Opportunity in Supervised Learning 1 (Oct. 7, 2016) (unpublished
manuscript) (on file with University of Chicago), https://ttic.uchicago.edu/~nati/Publications/
HardtPriceSrebro2016.pdf [https://perma.cc/4K7U-W539].
356. See, e.g., Tashea, supra note 314; Julia Dressel & Hany Farid, The Accuracy, Fairness,
and Limits of Predicting Recidivism, 4 SCI. ADVANCES 1, 1 (2018).
357. One additional complication is that this landscape may shift over time, further
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disseminated and exercised through a multilayered structure,
concerns at each layer about staying within socially approved
boundaries can compound: Elected officials may limit agencies’
power, or grant agencies power using vague, qualified language.358
Regulatory agencies may be wary of testing the vague boundaries
of their powers and may confine their actions to what they consider
safer legal and political ground.359 This dynamic can also play out
within the hierarchy of an agency.360 These repeated iterations of
caution in the face of uncertainty can significantly reduce the sphere
in which regulators ultimately operate.
Regulators know that if they do overstep, they run the risk of
provoking a backlash. A backlash can take many forms and may
manifest on a different front than the one on which regulators
overstepped. For example, suppose a regulator is considering
whether to make law more personalized by incorporating new da-
ta into a legal rule. If that action proves unpopular, how might so-
ciety respond? It might eliminate the regulator’s access to that type
of data entirely. It might take a particular enforcement tool out of
the regulator’s hands; it might prohibit the regulator from issuing
fines above a certain level or from garnishing wages.361 It might
require the regulator to meet higher procedural or transparency
hurdles before taking enforcement action.362 It could impose many
other measures as well, alone or in combination. The wide range of
possible societal responses increases regulators’ uncertainty about
the consequences of potentially controversial actions. This uncer-
tainty can encourage regulators to be conservative when designing
complicating regulators’ efforts to stay on safe footing.
358. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(2) (“[e]mpower[ing] and direct[ing the FTC] to prevent ...
[the use of] unfair methods of competition ... and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or
affecting commerce”); I.R.C. § 7611 (imposing limitations on the IRS’s ability to audit
churches, including requiring the approval of an IRS regional commissioner or higher to begin
an inquiry); I.R.C. § 5000A(g) (limiting the tools available to the IRS to enforce the Patient
Protection and Affordable Care Act’s requirement that individuals carry insurance); see also
Jordan M. Barry & Bryan T. Camp, Is the Individual Mandate Really Mandatory?, 135 TAX
NOTES 1633, 1633, 1642 (2012) (arguing that restrictions on the IRS’s ability to collect the
penalty make the individual mandate nonmandatory for many taxpayers).
359. Cf. Pollman & Barry, supra note 217, at 410-24 (discussing how businesses can take
the opposite approach).
360. See Jennifer Nou, Intra-Agency Coordination, 129 HARV. L. REV. 421, 429-30 (2015).
361. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 5000A(g).
362. See, e.g., id. § 7611 (imposing new procedural requirements on audits of churches).
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personalized laws or policing gamesmanship, thereby limiting how
personalized the law will be.
Finally, regulators will face uncertainty regarding how regulated
parties will react to personalized laws.363 Regulated parties have
frequently used rules in ways that policymakers did not anticipate
or desire.364 This history may push regulators toward caution and
incrementalism.365 Regulators may feel even more cautious when
legal rules are the result of a multidimensional, big data modeling
algorithm that no single individual may fully understand. This may
encourage regulators to be more conservative when designing
personalized laws, making the laws less personalized and more like
conventional legal systems.
CONCLUSION
When a regulator issues a rule, it can be tempting to see that as
the end of the story. But it is not. It is just one piece of a continuing
interaction. Regulated parties react to the rule, changing their
behavior. Some of those changes will be the ones regulators desired.
Others may be unexpected, and may necessitate further responses
from the regulator, continuing the back-and-forth cycle. Desired or
not, expected or not, these changes constitute a significant part of
the rule’s real-world effects.
This dynamic between regulators and regulated parties applies
with respect to personalized laws, just as it does in more conven-
tional regulatory settings. In fact, with more varied legal rules
tailored to more finely classified circumstances, regulated parties’
responses may become much more important in the context of
personalized law.
363. Modern data science techniques may give additional insight into this question. Still,
even when regulators think they know how regulated parties will react to personalized laws,
it will be difficult to know for sure.
364. See, e.g., Martin D. Ginsburg, Making Tax Law Through the Judicial Process, 70
A.B.A. J. 74, 76 (1984) (“[E]very stick crafted to beat on the head of a taxpayer will meta-
morphose sooner or later into a large green snake and bite the commissioner on the hind
part.”); Jordan M. Barry, Taxation and Innovation: The Sharing Economy as a Case Study,
in THE CAMBRIDGE HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF THE SHARING ECONOMY 381, 383 (Nestor M.
Davidson, Michèle Finck & John J. Infranca eds., 2018).
365. See Barry & Caron, supra note 81, at 73-74.
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The fact that regulated parties will react to regulation does not
mean that regulators cannot implement personalized laws or that
doing so will produce no benefits. To the contrary, personalized law
holds substantial promise and may mark a major step forward in
law’s long evolution.
But regulated parties’ reactions to regulation—in particular,
muddling data, signaling, and moral hazard—will complicate and
limit personalized law. Concerns about misjudging regulated
parties’ reactions, and about increasing regulated parties’ incentives
to change their legal treatment, will push regulators toward
adopting a lesser degree of personalization.
All of the issues described in this Article can be managed to
varying degrees, but they cannot be fully overcome. No matter how
good technology gets, we should never expect law to perfectly match
outcomes to circumstances. Regulated parties’ responses to
laws—even personalized ones—will always prevent regulators from
achieving the utopia that some envision. Personalized law may be
“the future of law,”366 but it is no panacea.
366. Casey & Niblett, supra note 1, at 1402.
